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Financial Crises and Civil Society
Claire R. Kelly*

Abstract
Internationalfinandal law institutions struggle to confrontfinancial crises effectively
andflexibly, playing the role of both regulatorand rescuer.At the same time, these institutions
confront demandsforgreaterlegitimay in light of the publicpolig implications of their actions.
Some might argue thatgreaterparticipationby civil society may serve tofoster greaterlegitimag
by improving representativeness, tranipareng,accountability, and reasoned decision-making.
But greater civil society access also has costs that can undermine both regulation and rescue
efforts. I argue that we should not presume greater civil society participation lends greater
legitimay to internationalfinancialinstitutions. Rather, we should examine various types of
civil society contributions at diferentpoints in thefinancial crisis and attempt to identify when
and what kind ofparticpationwould be most helpful in light of the roleplayed by the dferent
institutions involved. As a general rule subject to certain caveats, civil society groups whose
missions are closely related to interests affected by the institutions' actions can make their
greatest contribution to polig-settinginstitutions while civil society groups with a high degree of
expertise should be more involved with institutions when they are performing detailed rulemakingfunctions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2008 financial crisis challenged national and international lawmakers'
capacity and legitimacy to prevent and confront financial crises. The specific
challenges involved both preventative regulation and rescue measures.
International institutions involved in these efforts faced added legitimacy
challenges. This article examines civil society's involvement in the regulation and
rescue efforts involved in financial crises and how that involvement may impact
international financial institutions' legitimacy as well as their efforts.
Any analysis of global systemic crises should distinguish the various
opportunities for action as well as the need for coordination. Section II recounts
the different roles that international financial institutions play at different stages
of a crisis. Section II also explains why countries and institutions should
coordinate efforts to prevent, contain, and resolve financial crisis. It concludes
by identifying and categorizing those entities, organizations, and networks that
might play a role in each phase.
Understanding how society might cope with the potential for systemic
failures and global financial crises quickly reveals that the means to address
financial crises will likely involve policy choices and priority-setting that
implicate a plethora of public concerns. Any effort to prevent, contain, or
resolve financial crises will need to balance the costs and benefits of any
particular level of risk or remedy in terms of economic efficiency, growth, and
fairness. Choices made to prevent, contain, and resolve crises will have linkages
to other important societal concerns including, but not limited to, labor,
pensions, food security, and health care. Section III highlights some of the
policy choices involved in setting regulatory standards to prevent a crisis as well
as those involved in containing and resolving the crisis.

I

See, for example, G-20, G-20 Workshop on Securing SustainableEconomic Recovey: Chair'sStatement 1-3
at
online
2009),
Nov
(G-20
http://www.g20.org/Documents/20091115_SeoulWorkshopChairsSummary.pdf (visited Sept
14, 2010). Consider Financial Stability Board ("FSB"), PubAcations: Ongoingand Recent Works Relevant
at
online
Systems,
Financial
Sound
to
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/list/fsb-publications/tid-68/index.htm (visited Sept 17,
2010) ("Publcations").
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When one considers the type of overarching coordination needed in light
of the public policy choices, one must question the legitimacy of any efforts to
regulate at each stage of a financial crisis. Legitimacy matters not just from a
normative perspective, but also from a practical perspective. That which actors
do not perceive as legitimate will be less likely to succeed. Section IV briefly
explains how we might assess the legitimacy of global regulatory efforts. Section
IV also examines the scope of civil society participation that may be permitted
and the costs and benefits of inclusion. Finally, Section IV assesses the value of
participation at the different regulatory stages. It does so by categorizing both
the institutions that generate norms as well as the civil society organizations that
wish to influence them. Generally speaking, civil society groups whose missions
closely relate to interests affected by the institutions' actions should seek to
involve themselves with agenda setting institutions or forums at the policy
setting stage. Input at the rule-making stage should be limited to those groups
that can bring expertise to the task. These rules serve as a general guides with
important caveats to prevent capture and abuse. Moreover, the benefits of
greater participation likely outweigh the costs at the crisis prevention and crisis
resolution stages. However, arguably, the rescue stage cannot sustain the costs
of greater participation despite the very real policy choices that must be made
during the containment phase.
II. REGULATORS AND RESCUERS
Both regulators and rescuers play a role in financial crises. Crisis
prevention and crisis resolution essentially require regulatory action, that is,
standard setting. Crisis prevention consists of the regulatory management of
private risk.2 Crisis resolution, like crisis prevention, involves a long-term effort,
setting priorities, and sharing the burdens of the crisis.' Resolution also involves
burden-sharing choices, but in some sense requires priority-setting similar to
crisis prevention. It looks forward to see who should insure against future loss.4
To different degrees, regulation and rescue involve value judgments about risk,
stability, and fairness. Crisis containment involves rescue. Anna Gelpern has
explained containment, which she aptly describes as the urgent and brief period
where choices are made to "arrest[] financial collapse."s

2

Anna Gelpern, FinandalCrisis Containment,41 Conn L Rev 1051, 1064 (2009).

3

Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1067 (cited in note 2).

4

See, for example, David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Tweak Bank Bill to Preclude Bailouts, NY Times
B6 (Apr 30, 2010) (discussing a potential fund for future bank bailouts paid for by major financial
institutions).

s

Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 2).
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Both regulation and rescue require global coordination of a fragmented
regulatory structure' spread throughout different organizations, entities and
national authorities. Yet, one country's regulatory failure can easily infect
another country's economy.7 Some entities are poised (or could be) to regulate
prospectively to help avert systemic failures. Other entities are best able to
contain or resolve crises, while others are able to effectively contribute at all
stages. Among the possible entities that could be utilized are the G-20, the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), The
World Bank, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee), the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), and private law institutions such as the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The extent to
which all of these entities deliberate internally, with each other, and with civil
society more broadly affects not only the legitimacy of these institutions and the
actions they take but their effectiveness as well.'
A. Regulation: Crisis Prevention and Resolution
Crisis prevention and resolution both require coordinated prudential
regulation and monitoring. Prudential regulation compares the benefits of risk
taking against the likelihood and costs of a failure.10 Monitoring involves the

6

7
8

9

10

Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisisfor the New Centug: Some Observations on the "Big Picture" Lessons of
the Global FinancialCrisis of2008, 13 NC Bank Inst 157, 158 (2009) (explaining a fragmented and
nationally based system of regulation at tension with interconnected globalized financial markets).
Consider FSB, Exitfrom ExtraordinaryFinancialSector Support Measures (FSB Nov 7, 2009), online at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107b.pdf
(visited Sept 14, 2010)
("IExi).
See International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), World Economic Outlook- May 1998 83 (IMF 1998).
This list is not exhaustive. For example, one might include the IFRS and its independent
standard-setting body, the International Accounting Standards Board ("IASB"), online at
http://www.ifrs.org/The+organisation/IASCF+and+ASB.htm (visited Oct 20, 2010).
Legitimacy and effectiveness are linked. See Claire R. Kelly, The Poliics of InternationalEconomic
Law: Legitimay and the UNCITRAL Working Methods 20, in T. Broude, M. Busch, and A. Porges,
eds, The Poliics of InternationalEconomic Law: Risk and Opportunity in Crisis (Cambridge 2010).
Likewise international and national legitimacy are linked. As member countries of the WrO
become more democratic, the calls for the organization to democratize in order to establish
legitimacy become more pronounced. See Jeffrey Atik, Democrai~ng the IWTO, 33 Geo Wash Intl
L Rev 451, 460 (2001).
See Shahid Javed Burki and Guillermo Perry, Bgond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter 4445 (1998).
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sharing of data that informs regulators of potential crisis triggers." Resolution
also involves burden sharing, that is, dividing up the cost of failure.
Crisis prevention entails regulating to avoid risk of a systemic failure. Yet
crisis prevention is in tension with the fact that risk spurs economic activity.12
Actors want to take risks because they perceive that as a result they will benefit
from gains." The more risk actors incur, the greater their potential gains. Society
may wish to rein in risk takers through regulation because their behavior may
pose risks to society.14 Policy makers must decide how much risk society should
take in light of the potential gains to society that may be achieved from those
risks."
Markets face different types of risks, some of which can be managed by
market participants who can diversify to hedge against losses." Market
participants can manage business risks, market risks, liquidity risks, and credit
risk, to some extent, through diversification. Even if market participants can
(and would) manage risk in some cases, they will be unable to do so in cases of
systemic risk. Systemic risk involves risk to the system itself such that
diversification would not be able to afford protection." Steven Schwarcz defines
systemic risk as:
The risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure
triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of
markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial
11

12

13

See Nikola Spatafora, Global Financial Stability Report: Responding to the FinancialCrisis and Measuring
Systemic Risks, in The Global FinancialCrisis 2009: Preparingfor the Future, 1753 PLI/Corp 319, 419
(Aug 2009).
Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Mulisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77
Wash U L Q 319, 333 (1999) (discussing risk as both a good thing and a bad thing). See, for
example, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"), 2007/12
Economic Surveys: Italy 10, 40 (OECD June 2007).
Jackson, 77 Wash U L Q at 333 (cited in note 12).

14

Id at 334; Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 2) (noting that regulation reduces risk by
changing incentives). See E. P. Davis, Debt, FinancialFragility, and Systemic Risk 122-27 (Clarendon
2d ed 1995) (discussing risk regulation).

15

See Richard J. Herring and Robert E. Litan, FinancialRegulation in the GlobalEconomy 48 (Brookings
Inst 1995). See also Jackson, 77 Wash U L Q at 335 (cited in note 12) (discussing the
internationalization of social losses); Michael S. Barr and Geoffrey P. Miller, GlobalAdministrative
Law: The View from Basel, 17 Eur J Intl L 15, 23 (2006) (discussing capital standards and prudential
supervision). See, for example, Maarten A. Hajer and H. Wagenaar, Deliberative Policy Anaysis:
Understanding Governance in the Network Society 197-98 (Cambridge 2003) (discussing environmental
risks).
See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk
Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 Wash L Rev 127, 136-39 (2009) (providing a typology of
risks).

16

17

See id at 139.
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institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.18
As Schwarcz explains, market participants face a tragedy of the commons with
respect to risk, and therefore, we must rely upon regulation to avoid it." This
tragedy of the commons phenomenon supports the need for global
coordination as well as regulation, generally.
While regulation can reduce certain risks, it will not eliminate risk. Thus,
crisis prevention also requires warning systems.20 Economists and others who
monitor the financial sector need to have access to data. A warning system
requires transparency.2 As one economist points out, "[W]hile housing and
balance of payments data is widely available, few economists knew that financial
firms had become so leveraged or comprehended the nature of the real-estatebacked assets that these firms held." 22 Thus, in order for any monitoring system
to work, not only must national authorities share information, monitors must
understand the implications of that data. Thus, crisis prevention requires both
regulation and monitoring.
18

Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo L J 193, 204 (2008). Attention had been focused on
capital markets as the center for concerns over systemic risk. Id at 200. See also Mary Schapiro,
Testimony Concerning Regulations of Systemic Risk, in Institute on Securities Regulation (4 1' Annual) 1773
PLI/Corp 233 (Nov 2009). Chairman Schapiro explains that there are actually two kinds of
systemic risk. First there is the risk from sudden shocks that might cause systemic or cascading
seizures. There is also the "longer-term risk that our system will unintentionally favor large
systemically important institutions over smaller, more nimble competitors, reducing the system's
ability to innovate and adapt to change." Id at 235. The Financial Stability Board has defined
"systemic risk as a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all
or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences
for the real economy." IMF, Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") and FSB, Guidance to
Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations 5
(Oct 2009), online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_091107c.pdf (visited
Sept 14, 2010).

19

Schwarcz, 97 Geo LJ at 206 (cited in note 18).
See also G-20, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsbugh Summit 7 (Sept 24-25, 2009), online at
(visited
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburghsummitleadersstatement_250909.pdf
Sept 14, 2010); Barbara Matthews, Emerging Pubc InternationalBanking Law? Lessons from the Law of
the Sea Experience, 10 Chi J Intl L 539, 564 (2010); Roberta Karmel, Who Should Regulate Systemic
Risk?, NY L J, 3 (Oct 15, 2009) (online through Factiva) (arguing for a "monitor, not a
regulator").
See generally Anne Sibert, A Systemic Risk Warning System (VoxEU Jan 16, 2010), online at
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4495 (visited Sept 16, 2010) (arguing that if the
economists had been able to "collect, organise, analyse, store, and protect data on the market
prices of the on- and off-balance sheet assets and liabilities," it would enable them to assess the
impact of leverage and liquidity, assess correlation of asset prices and "estimate portfolios'
sensitivity to changes in economic conditions" before the advent of financial crisis). See IMF,
BIS, and FSB, Guidance to Assess at 23 (cited in note 18).

20

21

22

Sibert, A Systemic Risk (cited in note 21).
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Crisis resolution involves the same types of regulatory choices discussed in
24
23
crisis prevention, although it occurs in the shadow of the most recent crisis.
Thus, for example, after a G-20 Workshop on Secunng SustainableEconomic RecoveU,
the Chair issued a statement recognizing "that in relation to the post-crisis
management, [the] relationship between macroprudential policy and monetary
policy would likely to be one of the important issues to be discussed within G-

20."25

Crisis resolution also involves sharing the burdens of a past failure and
insuring against the burden of failure going forward.26 Regulators will determine
who should pay for the costs of insuring the system both as a means of
regulating conduct-for example, by placing the cost on the least cost
avoider-and as an equitable matter in light of past conduct in the most recent
crisis.
Finally, resolution also involves exit from the emergency measures
implemented to contain risk. Removing temporary support can toss the financial
sector back into disarray, can have serious effects on the real economy, and can
have cross-border effects. 27 Therefore, the withdrawal of emergency measures
must be managed so that the markets have clear expectations as to what will
happen.28
B. Rescue: Crisis Containment
Regulation that might avoid systemic risk, though, differs from regulations
or other action needed to confront the effects of systemic failure. 29 Authorities
must react and respond to systemic failure in ways that contain the crisis.30 This
mandate falls first on national governments faced with domestic concerns such
as insolvency, foreclosure, unemployment, and losses in the markets. Thus, for
example, both the US government and the European Commission enacted
spending measures to confront the crisis."' Anna Gelpern suggests that ensuring
23

See notes 11-22 and accompanying text.

24

25

See, for example, Hiroko Tabuchi, Backlash Builds in Japan to New Rules for Banks, NY Times
(Apr 22, 2010), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/business/global/23yen.html
(visited Oct 24, 2010).
G-20, G-20 Workshop: Chair's StatementT 23 (cited in note 1).

26

See Matthews, 10 Chi J Intl L at 558-61 (cited in note 20).

27

Id.

28

See FSB, Exit (cited in note 6).

29

Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1064 (cited in note 2).

30

Id.

31

See

BBC.com,
U.S. Congress Passes Stimulus Plan (Feb 19, 2009),
online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7889897.stm (visited Sept 16, 2010); CARS.gov, online at
http://www.cars.gov/ (visited Sept 17, 2010) (cash for clunkers program); European
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survival of a financial system can involve a series of decisions to suspend
regulations or rescue failing financial institutions.3 2 Thus, most recently we saw
US national authorities "bailing out" businesses, like American International
Group (AIG), because of the fear that the failure to do so would push otherwise
solvent entities into insolvency." We also saw bailouts that were not necessarily
tied to the risk of systemic failure, such as the US bailout of General Motors.34
These are distributive choices." They impose the burden of the regulatory
failure on some and take that burden off others. During the containment phase,
burden sharing may involve dividing burdens between creditors and debtors,
shareholders and bondholders, and individual entities or the taxpaying public. 6
Looking forward from a prudential standpoint, bailing out entities and
allowing them to start with a somewhat clean slate creates moral hazard.37 In
other words, alleviating the post transaction cost of risky behavior only
encourages future risky behavior.3 ' The G-20 Workshop on Securing Sustainable
Economic Recovery addressed different approaches to the moral hazard problem:
24. Participants were provided with information about the Financial
Stability Board's (FSB's) work program on reducing moral hazard posed by
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).

32

at
online
Crisis,
of
Economic
Social
Dimension
EU
Tackles
Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.isp?langld=en&catld=736 (visited Sept 17, 2010) (listing various
efforts by the EU to tackle the credit crunch).
Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1055 (cited in note 2). As Gelpern notes, these decisions contain a
political element. Id at 1067.

33

at
Tracker,
online
Bailout
CNNMony.com's
CNNMoney.com,
See
http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/index.html (visited Sept
17, 2010) (listing all federal government programs to ease the credit crunch). See Matthew
Karnitschnig, et al, U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout, CentralBanks Inject Cash as Credit
Dries Up -- Emergency Loan Efectively Gives Government Controlof Insurer; HistoricMove Would Cap 10
(Sept 18, 2008), online at
Days That Reshaped U.S. Finance, Wall St J Al
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122156561931242905.htmi (visited Sept 16, 2010).

34

See, for example, Lynn, Sweet, GeneralMotors Bailout Details, Chicago Sun Times (Jun 1, 2009),
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2009/06/general-motors-bailout over-vi.html
at
online
(visited Sept 16, 2010); The CarIndusty: Pass The Plate, The Economist (Nov 22, 2008), online at
http://www.economist.com/node/12629948 (visited Sept 16, 2010).

3s

See Gelpem, 41 Conn L Rev at 1076 (cited in note 2) (discussing government bailout as shifting
losses to the public). The parties relieved of the burdens could be "local pension funds ... ,
foreign municipalities that count on the income to maintain vital services,... retirees,... hedge
funds,. . . Wall Street investment banks . . . poor homeowners or wealthy corporations." Id.

36

See id.

37

See id; G-20, G-20 Workshop: Chair'sStatement$$ 24-29 (cited in note 1).

38

Tom Baker, On The Genealogy Of Moral Hagard, 75 Tex L Rev 237, 238 (1996) (discussing moral
hazard in various legal contexts, beyond financial regulation).
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25. There are broadly two approaches in tackling moral hazard posed by
SIFIs: One approach is to acknowledge the existence of SIFIs and find
ways to reduce probability and impact of a SIFI's failure. The other
approach is to ensure there can be no SIFIs. While the FSB has adopted the
first approach to date, there are others who prefer the second approach.
26. Currently, FSB is focusing their work on three areas:
*
reduce the probability and impact of failure of SIFIs.
*
improve resolution capabilities
strengthen market discipline and market infrastructure to deal with a
*
SIFI failure39
While the prospect of creating moral hazard is undesirable, bailing out failed
entities and shifting their losses onto others, such as taxpayers, may stave off
further failures,40 even though it may be unfair to impose such a burden on
taxpayers. The G20 Workshop acknowledges that systematically important
financial institutions might fail again.
In addition to whether States will support at-risk entities, how they do so
also matters. For example, a State may desire to support at-risk entities through
subsidies or trade restrictions that would implicate trading rules and might
spread risk to other countries. 4 ' The State may go into debt and as a result limit
its ability to address other issues of concern. Likewise, it may pay for losses
through higher taxes or cuts in services. These distributive choices may be
revisited and revised when it comes time to regulate in the resolution phase.
Finally, crisis containment requires a great deal of leadership. 42 The public
and the regulatory targets need to trust the leadership to ensure stability and
confidence in the markets.43
39

G-20, G-20 Workshop: Chair'sStatement

4

See Gelpem, 41 Conn L Rev at 1057 (cited in note 2).

41

See Recommendations of the Commission of Experts of the Presidentof the GeneralAssembly on Reforms of the
InternationalMonetay and FinancialSystem, UN General Assembly, 63d Sess, Agenda Item 48, UN
Doc A/63/838 12 (Apr 29, 2009), online at www.ipu.org/splz-e/financeO9/stiglitz.pdf (visited
Sept 18, 2010); The Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk and Regulation: New Erafor Capitaksm 10
(Econ Intell Unt 2009), online at http://graphics.eiu.com/pdf/Risk-and-regulation.pdf (visited
Sept 14, 2010) (noting that "already the World Bank has counted 47 trade-restricting steps by 17
of the G20 members, including the US, since November 2008").
Stanley Fischer, Financial Sector Crisis Management. Remarks at Seminar on Poliy Challengesfor the
online
at
14,
2001),
Context of Globaliation (June
Financial Sector in the
https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/061401.htm (visited Sept 16, 2010).

42

43

24-26 (cited in note 1).

See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
FinandalMeltdown of 2008 *35-36 (U Chi L & Econ, Olin Working Paper No 442; U Cbi, Pub L
Working Paper No 248; Harvard Pub L Working Paper No 08-50; Harvard L Sch Program on
13,
2008),
online
at
Paper
No
09-04
Nov
Risk
Reg
Rsrch
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1301164 (visited Sept 17, 2010).
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C. The Need for Coordinated Efforts
Avoiding the risk of systemic failure requires cross border coordination."
National authorities have limited capabilities, conflicting policy incentives, and
unique priorities.45 Moreover, the size of financial conglomerates makes a global
financial crisis difficult for any one country to handle. No matter what the
efforts of one country, financial failures spread from country to country.47 Some
possibilities for coordination include an international risk regulator,48
coordination of existing regulators,4 9 or a risk monitor.o This article does not
advocate a coordination model; instead it focuses on how any model might
account for the views of civil society.
Several entities might play a role in regulating or monitoring systemic risk
including the G-20, the FSB, the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, the Basel
Committee, IOSCO, the WTO, UNCTAD, and private law institutions
(UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT and the Hague). One way of analyzing how these
various institutions may coordinate their regulatory and monitoring efforts is to
loosely classify them by different governing roles: the Executive, the
Coordinating Regulator, Information and Implementation Bodies, and Standard

44

See Omarova, 13 NC Bank Inst at 160 (cited in note 6) (discussing the college of supervisors).

45

Id at 159; Douglas W. Amer and Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the Financial
Stability Board:Hardening the Soft law of InternationalFinancialRegulation, 32 U New S Wales L J 488,
492 (2009) (questioning the reliance upon national authorities for addressing crises). See also
Angelique Leondis, The GlobalFinandalCrisis: The G-20's Most RecentAction Plan, 25 Bank & Fin L
Rev 315, 317-20 (2010).

46

Omarova, 13 NC Bank Inst at 159 (cited in note 6).

47

See, for example, Gelpem, 41 Conn L Rev at 1059 (cited in note 2) (discussing national systems
and how failure travels from entity to entity). G-20, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors, London: Declaration on Further Steps to Strengthen the FinancialSystem 4 (Sept 4-5, 2009),
online at http://www.g20.org/Documents/FM-CBGDeclaration_-_Final.pdf (Sept 14, 2010)
(stating the need to tackle "non-cooperative jurisdictions') (hereinafter "Meeting ofFin Mins').

48

See, for example, COM, Communicationfrom the Commission: European FinancialSupenision 15 (2009)
at
online
final,
252
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/fsnances/docs/committees/supervision/communication~m
ay2009/C-2009_715_en.pdf (visited Sept 16, 2010).

49

See Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered 'Too Big To Fail",Hearing before the Senate Comm
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong 100 (May 6, 2009) (statement of Sheila C.
Bair, Chairman, FDIC), online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrgl79/pdf
(visited Sept 18, 2010) (discussing the proposed Council of Regulators).

50

See Roberta S. Karmel, The Contvversy Over Systemic Risk Regulation 6-7, 18 (Brooklyn J Intl L
forthcoming, Brooklyn L Sch, Legal Studies Paper No 179 Jan 22, 2010), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540691 (visited Sept 16, 2010) (discussing the proposed European
Systemic Risk Council to act as a risk monitor).
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Setting Bodies. Some entities could be classified as falling into more than one
category.
1. The Executive: the G-20.
If one were to think of the various international entities as agencies of a
sort, the G-20 might be considered akin to the Executive." The Group of
Twenty (G-20)5 2 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was established
in 1999 after the Asian Financial Crisis "to bring together systemically important
industrialized and developing economies to discuss key issues in the global
economy."53 As a center of discussion and coordination, the G-20 already
coordinates with the IMF and World Bank and established the FSB as the
successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).5 4 Although the G-20 aims to
foster standard setting it deems desirable, it does not set standards and it does
not maintain a secretariat or staff. Still, it turns politics into law through its use
of International Organizations (lOs) and trans-governmental networks. As
Barbara Matthews notes:
Importantly, the G20 is creating a process by which standards articulated
by informal groups .

.

. are recognized and applied, if not "ratified," by

formal, treaty-based international organizations (IMF; BIS) and political
groups (G20). This adds a layer of legitimacy to the informal global
normative process and provides positive evidence of the intent to rely on
the standards generated by the global policy groups as binding
international law.55
Thus, the G20 facilitates both norm generation and norm adoption.

51

In fact the G20 infused the IMF with $750 billion in cash to respond to the crisis. David Zaring,
InternaionalInstitutionalPerformancein Crisis, 10 Chi

52

J Ind

L 475, 478-79 (2010). This action seems

to parallel what an executive might do on a national basis.
The finance ministers and central bank governors of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and The European Union
(represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Central Bank) make up the G20. G-20, About G20, online at http://www.g20.org/about-what-is.g20.aspx (visited Sept 14,

2010).
See id.
M See FSB, HistoU, online at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (visited Sept
17, 2010).
ss Matthews, 10 Chi J Intl L at 555 (cited in note 20).
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The G-20 acted at several key points in the most recent crisis by convening
summits of the G-20 Leaders: Washington, London, Pittsburgh, and Toronto.s6
As it worked through these summits, the G-20 has evolved from a short-term
crisis manager to long-term policy planner and the premier international
economic coordination forum." It has directed the FSB to coordinate with
other international financial institutions as well as with other non-financial
international institutions to address the linkages between financial regulations
and other areas of public concern."
2. Coordinating regulator: The FSB.
The Financial Stability Board aims "to enhance cooperation among the
various national and international supervisory bodies and international financial
institutions so as to promote stability in the international financial system."5 9
The FSB has been identified by Douglas Arner and Michael Taylor as a potential
lead entity for coordination. They suggest that "standard-setting would continue
to rest with individual standard-setting organizations such as the Basel
Committee, IOSCO and the like, with coordination through the FSB."6 o These
standard-setting entities are now members of the FSB as a result of the G-20's

56

G-20, Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (Nov 15, 2008), online at
http://www.g20.org/pub-communiques.aspx (visited Sept 14, 2010); G-20, The Pittsburgh
Summit: Creating a 21st Century International Economic Architecture, online at
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/resources/129666.htm (visited Oct 25, 2010); G-20, The
Global Planfor Recovey and Reform (Apr 2, 2009), online at http://www.g20.org/Documents/finalcommunique.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2010); G-20, Leader's Statement (cited in note 20); G-20, The G-20
Toronto Summit Declaration Gune 27, 2010), online at http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summitsommet/2010/toronto-declaration-toronto.aspx?lang=eng (visited Sept 14, 2010); G-20, Prinables
at
online
2010),
(une
27,
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Financial
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http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-sommet/2010/toronto-principlestoronto.aspx?lang=eng (visited Sept 14, 2010). While this paper was going to press the G-20 also
convened the Seoul Summit. See G-20, Leaders Declaration:Seoul Summit (Nov 11-12, 2010), online
at http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit-declaration.pdf (visited Dec 26, 2010).
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G-20, Leader's Statement 19 (cited in note 20). See Hans Nichols and Simon Kennedy, G-20 to
Assume Mantle as World's Main Economic Body, Bloomberg.com (Sept 25, 2009), online at
(visited Sept
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16, 2010).
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expansion of both the FSB's membership and mandate in 2009." The FSB has
issued several reports dealing with the most recent crisis and has coordinated
and reported on the activities of several key institutions.62
3. Information and implementation bodies: IMF, World Bank, and
the OECD.
a) The IMF. The IMF facilitates global monetary cooperation using three
tools: economic surveillance; technical assistance; and lending.64 First, the IMF
monitors the economic health of member countries, which alerts them to
potential risks. Through its system of "multilateral and bilateral surveillance," 6 it
annually evaluates all 186 of its member countries and then discusses with each
country "whether there are risks to the economy's domestic and external
stability that would argue for adjustments in economic or financial policies."
The IMF may also engage in multilateral consultations involving global stability
issues." Its technical assistance focuses on a variety of topics including "fiscal
policy, monetary and exchange rate policies, banking and financial system
supervision and regulation, and statistics." 6 It also lends to countries in financial
crisis. For example, the IMF recently loaned the Ukraine $16 billion to aid its
banking industry.69 The IMF could serve in a role as a crisis preventer; some
63

61

62

FSB,
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10,
online
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publication s/r_090925d.pdf (visited Sept 16, 2010).
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(visited Sept 14,
2010); FSB, Exit (cited in note 6). See also FSB, Ongoing and Recent Work Relevant to Sound Financial
at
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(Sept
Systems
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63
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See IMF, Our Work, online at http://www.imf.org/external/about/ourwork.htm (visited Sept 16,
2010).
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at
online
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Paper
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09247.pdf (visited Sept 14, 2010).
Id; see also IMF, The 2007 Surveillance Decision: Revised OperationalGuidance 9 (June 22, 2009), online
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/062209.pdf (visited Sept 16, 2010).
IMF, How We Do It, online at http://www.imf.org/external/about/howwedo.htrn (visited Sept
16, 2010).
David Robinson, IMF-Backed Plan to Cut Global Imbalances (IMF Aug 7, 2007), online at
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have suggested that it should. 7 It could possibly use its monitoring capabilities
to sound the alarm so to speak. 1 Nonetheless, in the most recent crisis, it played
little to no role in crisis prevention.7 2 It has, however, emerged as a force in the
containment of the crisis with respect to Greece. In terms of crisis resolution,
it has assisted the G-20 with its Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced
Growth.74 It has also coordinated with the FSB to explore gaps in data collection
at the direction of the G-20." When it provides resources, as in the Greek
bailout, it also enforces principles and standards in conjunction with providing
those resources.
b) The World Bank. The World Bank consists of five institutions? It
provides loans to developing countries fostering economic and social
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(visited Sept 14, 2010) ("IMF and FSB, Fin Crisisand Info Gaps").

73

Landon Thomas Jr. and Nicholas Kulish, LM.E Promises More Aid for Greece as European Crisis
at
online
2010)
28,
(Apr
P1
Times
NY
Gmws,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/29/business/global/29euro.htm (visited Oct 25, 2010).

74

G-20, Communiqui: Meeting of FinanceMinisters and CentralBank Governors 3 (Apr 23, 2010), online
at http://www.g20.org/Documents/201004_communique_-WashingtonDC.pdf (visited Sept 14,
2010).

75

See IMF and FSB, Fin Crisis and Info Gaps (cited in note 72).
See Joseph Stiglitz, Globali.ationand its Discontents 106 (WW Norton 2003).

76

77

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD"), the International
Development Association ("IDA"), the International Finance Corporation ("IFC"), the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), and the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes ('ICSID"). For a complete description of these five
institutions see World Bank, A Guide to the World Bank 10-23 (World Bank 2003).

518

Vol 11 No. 2

Kelly

FinancialCrisesand Civil Society

development. 8 Member countries fund The World Bank through the purchase
of capital stock.7 ' As the Bank itself states, it provides resources for the benefit
of "education, health, public administration, infrastructure, financial and private
sector development, agriculture and environmental and natural resource
management."so In the last crisis, it played little to no role in either prevention or
containment."' To be fair, however, one could describe the Bank's assistance
throughout the crisis as critical for alleviating suffering during the crisis.8 2 It also
assisted the G-20 with its Frameworkfor Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth."
Also, like the IMF, where the World Bank provides resources, it also enforces
principles and standards in conjunction with providing those resources.
c) The OECD. The OECD emerged from the previously formed
Organization or European Cooperation." As James Salzman notes, after the
creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, it reconstituted itself
78
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24,
1960),
(Sept
articlesofagreement.pdf (visited Sept 18, 2010). See also World Bank, Lending & Assistance,
online at http://go.worldbank.org/C8HRKONV20 (visited Nov 25, 2010).
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as the OECD partially in response to the Cold War." There are thirty three
countries that are members of the OECD." The OECD fosters trade,
commerce and economic development." It provides a forum where
governments can share information regarding good practices for responding to
the economic, social, and governance challenges of globalization." In response
to the crisis, the OECD set forth key principles for financial regulation90 and
issued several reports on the crisis.9 '
4. Standard-setting bodies: The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, IOSCO, WTO, UNCTAD, and private law bodies.
a) The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision in partnership with the Bank for International Settlements
is a transgovernmental network that "generates global public goods of
information and expertise." 92 Its framers proposed that it would serve as a
forum for multinational bank supervision." One way to avoid risk might be to
confront the danger of bank failure that could set off a chain of losses. The
Basel Committee's efforts to set capital-adequacy standards addressed this
concern.9 4 Technically, the Basel Committee has no legal standing to force
anyone to do anything. It simply develops best practices.95 As David Zaring has
86

Id.

87

OECD,

88

online
at:
(visited
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1__1,00.html
November 23, 2010)
Id. See also Roberta Karmel and Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securiies Regulation, 34
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http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052
17, 2010).
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Brooklyn J Intl L 883, 903 (2009).
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(Dec 3, 2009), online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/53/44187223.pdf (visited
Principles
Sept 14, 2010).
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See, for example, Makoto Minegishi and Boris Coumede, Monetay Polg Responses to the Crisis and
Exit Strategies (Econ Dept Working Papers No 753 Feb 18, 2010), online at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2010doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT0000OC9E/$FILE/JT03278895.PDF
(visited Sept 16, 2010); Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Gert Wehinger and Patrick Slovik, The Elephant in
the Room: The Need to Deal with What Banks Do (Fin Mkt Trends Oct 2009), online at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/44357464.pdf (visited Sept 14, 2010).
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Matthews, 10 Chi J Intl L at 546 (cited in note 20).
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already noted, it initially failed to offer any meaningful response to the most
recent crisis," and indeed has taken some of the blame for it.9 7 The G-20 has
continuously expressed its support of the Basel Committee, commending it for
progress and innovation."
b) IOSCO. Some observers might look to securities commissions to avoid
systemic risk and thus seek guidance from IOSCO. IOSCO is a
transgovernmental network of securities regulators that has tremendous
influence on the development of securities norms across the globe.99 One might
think that expecting IOSCO to prevent a crisis would be reasonable given that
its members formed the organization to:
Cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order to
maintain just, efficient and sound markets; to exchange information on
their respective experiences in order to promote the development of
domestic markets; to unite their efforts to establish standards and an
effective surveillance of international securities transactions; and to
provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a
rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement
against offenses.100
Moreover, IOSCO bases its Objectives and Prinzoles of Securities Regulation
(OPSR) upon three objectives: "(1) the protection of investors; (2) ensuring that
range of other policies and market practices that make adoption in some form or another difficult
to resist for developing nations(]").
96

Zaring, 10 Chi J Intl L at 478 (cited in note 51).
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Id at 483 (discussing some of the blame leveled at the Basel Committee). Cannata and
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Rsrch Paper No 3/09 (Jan 14, 2009), online at http://ssm.com/abstract=1330417 (visited Sept
14, 2010).
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markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; and (3) the reduction of systemic
risk."'o' Yet, at least in the US, the focus of securities laws has not been
prudential regulation to avoid risk but rather disclosure.'02 IOSCO has engaged
in some prudential regulation of broker/dealers," 3 but without startling
success.'" In response to the crisis, it has come out with several reports dealing
with the regulation of hedge funds and other important issues.'os But like the
Basel Committee, IOSCO failed to offer a forum for a serious response to the
most recent crisis. 06
c) The WITO. The WTO operates as a trade-liberalizing institution and
moves much too slowly to be expected to respond to crises in a proactive way.
Instead it operates in a prophylactic capacity. The WTO has 153 members. It
administers the international trade rules.1o' Since its inception as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948, it has gone through a series
of negotiations known as rounds, provided for increasingly liberalized-trade
rules, expanded its scope to regulate trade-related issues, and developed a highfunctioning system of dispute resolution." The WTO states its most important
purpose as "help[ing] trade flow as freely as possible."' Lawmaking at the
WTO occurs primarily through dispute resolution.' As Jeffrey Atik explains,
at
(2003),
online
Objectives and Princafles of Securities Regulation 2
101 IOSCO,
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf (visited Sept 14, 2010).
102 See George S. Dallas, Governance and Risk: An Analytical Handbook for Investors, Managers, Directors
and Stakeholders 171 (McGraw-Hill 2004).
103 Principle 22 of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulations states that: "[t]here
should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential requirements for market intermediaries
that reflect the risks that the intermediaries undertake." IOSCO, Guidance to Emerging Market
Regulators Regarding CapitalAdequay Requirementsfor FinancialIntermediaries 3 (Dec 2006), online at
http://www.secp.gov.pk/Reports/IOSCO%20Capital%/20adequacy.pdf (visited Nov 25, 2010).
For example, intermediaries, being the fundamental elements of market structure, as well as
industry participants, are regulated by the national regulators indirectly at best. See Robert B.
Ahdieh, Law's Signal A Cueing Theory Of Law In Market Transition, 77 S Cal L Rev 215, 271 (2004)
(noting that the SEC regulates brokers indirectly).
10o See, for example, IOSCO, Disclosure Princrlesfor Public Offerings and Listings of Asset-Backed Securities
(Apr 2010), online at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD318.pdf (visited
Dec 1, 2010); Technical Committee of the IOSCO ("Tech Comm IOSCO"), Elements of
InternationalRegulatory Standards on Funds of Hedge Funds Related Issues Based on Best Market Practices:
Final Report (2009), online at http://www.iosco.org/1ibrary/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD305.pdf
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"the WTO is starved institutionally; there is no legislature and not much
administration. WTO lawmaking follows the GATT tradition of 'rounds,'
complex multilateral negotiations that resemble constitutional conventions more
than ordinary legislation.""'
In times of crisis, the WTO constrains governments from taking
protectionist measures.112 The national treatment"' and most-favored-nation" 4
rules enforce the nondiscrimination principle at a time when governments might
like to discriminate either in favor of their own economy or against specific
trading partners."' The WTO has partnered with UNCTAD and the OECD to
report to the G-20 on trade and investment protectionism."' Their reports were
cautiously optimistic with respect to trade and investment measures adopted
during the time frames covered."'
d) UNCTAD. UNCTAD "promotes the development-friendly integration
of developing countries into the world economy.""' 8 Its work primarily focuses
on developing norms in a research driven, consensus-building manner."'
UNCTAD assists developing countries to implement positive economic
policies in areas such as commodity diversification, competition, and consumer
policies. 20 It also assists developing countries in a variety of ways in their trade
relations.' 2 ' While it held a public symposium on the crisis in 2009, it has had no

111
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112
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other significant role in the process of coping with the crisis directly.'2 2 It has,
however, launched the Investment Poliy Monitor,which periodically reports on the
latest developments in foreign-investment policies at the national and
international levels in response to the G-20's call for reporting on trade and
investment protectionism.123
e) Private law institutions: UNCITRAL, InternationalInstitutefor the Unfication of
Private Law (UNIDROIT), The Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Various private law institutions serve as forums for the international
harmonization and modernization of private law. These include the
UNCITRAL, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), or the Hague Conference on Private International Law.124 These
institutions do not regulate in the sense of imposing public law obligations on
member states. In fact, they deal typically only with private law matters and
develop standards that states may adopt or ignore at their option. Thus, they are
not likely crisis preventers or managers. But some of their work could impact
financial crisis regulation. For example, crisis resolution involves burden sharing,
which implicates international insolvency. UNCITRAL has developed a guide
on international insolvency.125 Moreover, even though these organizations
cannot impose their products on members, other organizations might. Thus, the

122 See UNCTAD, Symposium on Financial Crisis Asks, What Next? (May 19, 2009), online at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemlD=4867&lang=1 (visited Dec 1, 2010).
123 See UNCTAD, 1 Investment Poliy Monitor A Periodic Report by the UNCL4D Secretariat 1 (Dec 4,
2009), online at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia200911 en.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
The OECD, in conjunction with the WTO and UNCTAD, issued the Report on G20 Trade and
Investment Measures, specifically in response to the G20's call for such a report. See OECD,
WTO, and UNCTAD, Report on G20 Trade (cited in note 116).
124 General Assembly Res No 2205/21, UN Doc A/6396
II.8(b)-(d) (Dec 17, 1966), online at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/005/08/IMG/NR000508.pdf0OpenElement
(visited Oct 25, 2010) (stating that UNCITRAL's function is to prepare and promote new
standards, uniform interpretation of those standards, and greater participation in, and acceptance
of, pre-existing laws and conventions); Statute of the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT), Art 1 (Mar 15, 1940) (as amended Mar 26, 1993), online at
http://www.unidroit.org/mm/statute-e.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010) (stating that the function of
UNIDROIT is "to examine ways of harmonising and coordinating the private law of States and
groups of States'); id at Art 14 (providing that the Governing Council submit any approved drafts
to member governments and facilitate conferences to discuss the drafts, if desirable); Statute of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Art 1 (July 15, 1955) (as amended Jan 1,
2007), online at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=29 (visited Dec
1, 2010) ('The purpose of the Hague Conference is to work for the progressive unification of the
rules of private international law."); id at Art 8 (authorizing the creation of "Special Commissions
to prepare draft Conventions or to study all [relevant] questions of private international law').
125 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), UNCITRAL Model
at
online
Enactment,
to
Guide
aith
Insolvenq
Cross-Border
on
Law
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
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World Bank might insist that borrower nations adopt an UNCITRAL Model
Law or Legislative Guide.'2 6
II. THE COST OF FAILURE
Whichever institution or institutions take part in regulating to prevent,
contain, or resolve a financial crisis, they will need to balance the costs and
benefits of any particular level of risk (both in terms of the probability of a crisis
and its costs) against the economic development thwarted by regulation. They
should also consider the costs a failure would impose on other sectors of public
concern including labor, the environment, and health care, among others. In
some ways the existing fragmentation of institutions has successfully avoided indepth consideration of these linkages.127 The most recent crisis brings these
costs and linkages into focus.
A. Costs for Regulation and Rescue
Each phase of a crisis has costs. Regulators balance those costs against the
off-setting benefits even in instances when both are somewhat speculative. At
the containment and resolution phases, issues of costs combine with issues
concerning the distribution of those costs.
Regulators balance risk against gain to the benefit and detriment of market
participants and the public. One needs to identify the appropriate level of
restraint on the market that will maximize market gains without precipitating a
crisis. National regulators face these risk choices. Thus, for example, in the US
much criticism has been levied against the Federal Reserve's actions when faced
with increasing "use of derivatives and the securitization process." 2 8 It chose
not to curtail those activities, finding that they "would better distribute risks
across financial institutions."' The choice not to regulate also allows for gains.

126

127

128

129
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at
online
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(visited Dec 1,
2010).
Eyal Benvenisti and George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the
Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, 60 Stan L Rev 595, 599 (2007) (discussing one "fragmentation
strategy" as "avoiding broad, integrative agreements in favor of a large number of narrow
agreements that are functionally defined").
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Prehminary Staff Report: The Role of the FederalReserve in Banking
Supenision and Regulation 15 (Apr 7, 2010), online at http://fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0407PreliminaryStaffReportRole_of_FederalReserveinBankSupervision-andRegulation.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
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The benefits of risk-taking extend beyond market participants. Thus, the Federal
Reserve's approach to capital markets' role in credit intermediation lowered "the
costs of market-based finance for many market participants.""o The extent to
which the financial markets are regulated impacts not only those regulated but
also the general public.'' Economic growth funds all sorts of positive endeavors
and programs: labor benefits, national treasuries grow, and legislatures have
more money to fund worthy social projects. In some sense a deregulatory
attitude benefits everyone. But some parties benefit more than others in a
deregulatory setting. Thus, one needs to consider how the costs of the risk will
be spread should there be a failure.
Second, if a crisis ensues, a crisis response might include regulatory action
(such as changing private relationships), but also rescuing financial institutions
with public money. 3 2 Governments create moral hazard when they relieve legal
or financial obligations.' 33 Future actors believe that they will be bailed out when
their risky activities fail and therefore may be more likely to take on risk that
they would not otherwise take. 11 Moreover, bailing out failed entities costs
money."' The cost can be significant and can burden future generations.' 6 At
the same time, systemic risk endangers the entire system and containment might
save the system from the cost of failure.137 Otherwise, steady entities may fail
because of the risky behavior of others, prompting broader systemic failure. 3 1
Third, if a crisis emerges, the issue becomes how regulators will distribute
the burdens. 139 This question arises both domestically and internationally.
Domestically, governments may bail out companies with public money thereby

130 Id. See also Posner and Vermeule, Global Governance at 8-9 (cited in note 43).
131 See Group of Thirty Report, Financial Refom.:A Framework for FinancialStability 4 (2009), online at
http://www.group30.org/pubs/recommendations.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010); Omarova, 13 NC
Bank Inst at 161 (cited in note 6) (raising "questions about the continuing wisdom of a
deregulatory approach to wholesale financial markets").
132

See Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1057-59 (cited in note 2) (discussing alternatives during crisis).

133

Id at 1056.

'34

Id at 1064.

135

Id at 1081.

136

Consider, Nancy Rosenblum, Responsible Congess and Political Time, 89 BU L Rev 715, 720 (2009);
Neil H. Buchanan, Social Securit, Generationa/Jusice,and Long-Term Defidts, 58 Tax L Rev 275, 283 n
13 (2005); Maurice Wright, Japan'sFiscalCrids: The Ministry ofFinance and the Politics of Public Spending
533 (2002).
See Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1058 (cited in note 2).

137
138
139

See George Kaufman, Bank Failures,Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 Cato J 17, 17 (1996). See
generally Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev 1051 (cited in note 2).
See Amer and Taylor, 32 U New S Wales L J at 491-92 (cited in note 45) (discussing different
stages of crisis regulation).
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shifting the burden to the taxpayer.'" Conversely, contagion that stems from the
failure to bail out a company may cost the taxpayers more.' 4' Internationally, as
entities face collapse, their creditors will face limited assets located in different
jurisdictions. 42 The idea of burden sharing raises the possibility that states may
be reluctant to sacrifice stakeholders in their own jurisdictions to benefit
stakeholders elsewhere.' 4 '
B. Linkages
The 2008 crisis focused attention on linkages between financial regulation
and other public issue areas-linkages that had in the past been obscured to
some extent by fragmentation. Economic regulation has natural linkages to a
variety of societal concerns.'" International entities elide the discussion of
linkages by claiming a narrow mandate.145 Fragmentation of international
economic law in particular enables entities to avoid addressing non-economic
law issues.14' For example, the WTO has received a great deal of criticism for its
refusal to take up the linkage between trade and other issue areas. 47 Other areas
of economic law, including financial regulation, implicate public concerns as
14
141

142
143

144

145

146

147

See Gelpern, 41 Conn L Rev at 1057 (cited in note 2).
Aaron Unterman, Perverse Incentives: Risk Taking and Reform, 28 No 6 Bank & Fin Serv Poly Rep 11,
11 (2009).
See Kaufman, 16 Cato J at 19-20 (cited in note 138).
Leondis, 25 Bank & Fin L Rev at 327 (cited in note 45) (noting that in the event of international
crisis, some domestic governments might favor their own financially important entities).
See Thomas Cottier, ChallengesAhead in InternationalEconomic Law, 12 J Intl Econ L 3, 13 (2009).
See, for example, Salzman, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 197 (cited in note 85) (discussing the
connection between regulation of foreign direct investment and labor, the environment and other
social welfare concerns).
See, for example, Barr and Miller, 17 Eur J Intl L at 26 (cited in note 15) (noting that despite
opening up its proposals to public comment, the Basel Committee received very little input from
the broader public in part because the broader social concerns were not pronounced). See also
at
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to Harness their Complementarities?, 7 J Intl Econ L 717, 723 (2004); Debra Steger, Afterword, The
Boundaries of the WITO: The 'Trade and..." Conundrum-A Commentary, 96 Am J Intl L 135, 137 (2002)
(arguing that the WTO's mandate is to first and foremost about trade and promoting market
access); Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of Market Access, 96
Am J Intl L 56, 56 (2002) (explaining that non-trade concerns need not be dealt with within the
WrO).
See Cottier, 12 J Intl Econ L at 12-15 (cited in note 144) (discussing the financial crisis and
fragmentation).
Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected
Islands, 25 Mich J Intl L 903, 905 (2004) (discussing the danger of circumvention of non-traderelated concerns).
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well.'4 8 Financial crises affect every conceivable aspect of public concern.149
However, this breadth of affected interests should not preclude efforts to
acknowledge those interests from a legitimacy perspective. In fact, as I will
discuss in Section IV.B, the scope of the relationship between financial
regulation and issues of public concern offers a compelling reason for a more
proactive, yet nuanced, integration between civil society and financial
regulators.'50
C. Labor
The collapse of the financial markets directly affects the real economy.
When financial markets fail, credit tightens, commodity prices fluctuate, and
demand falls."' As a result, businesses in a broad variety of sectors suffer,
causing them to cease hiring, cut hours, and/or lay workers off. 152 Some
businesses close. Even when the financial markets recover, the businesses that
survived are cautious about returning people to work.' Some workers never
attain the same wage level they had prior to the crisis.' 54

148
149

150

Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legiimay of Global Governance Institutions, 20 Ethics &
Intl Affairs 405, 407 (2006) (noting that individuals can be affected by global rules).
Indeed, some have characterized financial stability as a public good. See Marc Quintyn and
Michael Taylor, Regulatog and Superisoy Independence and FinancialStability 4 (2002 IMF Working
Paper No 02/46).
See notes 293 to 325 and accompanying text (discussing integration at the policy setting level).
The idea that the time has come to discontinue the debate over state sovereignty versus
globalization is not new. See, for example, Robert Howse, The End of the GlobaliZation Debate:A
Review Essay, 121 Harv L Rev 1528, 1530, 1533 (2008) (noting that the debate has now shifted to
one over values).

151 ILO, The Economic Crisis: Sectorial Aspects, Covering the Global Economic Crisis, online at
http://www.io.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/themes/crisis/assess.htm
(visited Dec 1,
2010).
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2010).
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See Something Is Not forking; America's Labour Market, The Economist (Apr 29, 2010) online at
1, 2010);
(visited Dec
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2010),
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Unemployment as a result of the 2008 crisis rose globally. In 2009, the
ILO projected that unemployment worldwide will reach 7.1 percent."' Workers
in poorer countries suffer in particular. In 2009 alone, an estimated forty-six
million more people were pushed into poverty (living on less than $1.25 a
day)."' The process is a vicious cycle.s 7 "Job losses lead to lower consumption,
which lowers industrial confidence, which leads to less investment, which results
in more job losses, and so on."" 8
Rich and poor countries alike face labor struggles. The OECD projected
that unemployment in OECD areas would average 6.3 percent in the last
quarter of 2008, and peak at 7.3 percent in the second quarter of 2010.'1" The
ILO reported that "[o]ver 6 million jobs were lost in manufacturing, 2.8 million
in construction and 2.3 million in wholesale and retail trade in the two years to
the third quarter of 2009 among fifteen G-20 countries with available data." 6 o
Labor leaders (and others) have made the connection between financial
regulatory policy and its impact on the work force. Commenting on the impact
of the financial crisis on workers, one official argued:
We need financial policies that promote productive investment, restrain
speculative behaviour, ensure transparency and rebuild credibility in the
system. In an open international system, the quality of national banks and
other financial institutions practices and instruments should be subject to
international standards of supervision. The surveillance mechanism of the
IMF must apply with equal weight to big and powerful nations as well as
smaller and weaker countries ...
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opportunities worldwide is one of the foundations of a sustainable
recovery and a fair globalization. 161
D. Pensions
The financial crisis has hit pensions hard and in a very public way.162 The
OECD reported that in the first ten months of 2008, private pensions in the
"OECD have registered losses of nearly 20 percent of their assets (equivalent to
$5 trillion)." 63 Older workers were particularly at risk. 6411Those who heavily
invested in equities or asset-backed securities likewise were more at risk.'65 Some
reports expressed concern that these developments may result in backlash
reactions against private pension systems, which inappropriately undervalues
their long-term usefulness.6 6 The impact on pensions spills over into many
aspects of society. Without stable pensions, "precautionary savings might have
to rise, affecting consumer behavior, and there could be adverse impacts on
government finances associated with a need to strengthen social safety nets."' 67
E. Health Care
As the economic crisis pushed an estimated 100 million people into
poverty, some commentators have expressed the concern that the economic
crisis would become a health crisis.' 6 ' The decline in private financial flows,
foreign direct investment, and remittances in addition to the decrease in exports,
all undermine the capacity of developing countries to provide for the health of
161 Juan Somavia, Sustainable Recovey and Shaping a Fair Globaliation, Remarks to the International
Monetary and Finance Committee and Development Committee (Oct 10-11, 2008), ILO, online
(visited
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/speeches/somavia/2008/imfc.pdf
Dec 1, 2010). See also G-20, Leaders' Statement (cited in note 20).
162

Tamara Keith, Pension Woes May Deepen FinancialCrisisfor States, NPR News (Mar 21, 2010), online
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=124894618 (visited Dec 1, 2010).
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at
(visited Dec 1, 2010) (hereinafter "Fin Crisisand Glob Health').

168

Pension
Markets
in
Focus
(Dec
2008),
online
at
http://www.oecd.org/datsoecd/42/19/41770561.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010) (discussing impacts
of crisis and possible short and long term policy interventions).

530

VoL 11 No. 2

FinandalCrisesand CiilSodety

Kelly

their citizens.' Moreover, resulting currency devaluations "increase the costs in
local currencies of all imported health expenditures: medicines, autoclaves,
syringes, X-ray machines and other hospital equipment." 70
The threat extends to developed countries. As the WHO reports, "[m]any
high-income and upper middle-income countries will experience negative real
income growth and substantial increases in unemployment, with their
consequent impact on health."17' Some have questioned physicians' willingness
to extend charity care as they have seen their pensions suffer. Others predict
aspiring physicians will have a difficult time securing school loans or will trend
towards more lucrative specialties exacerbating an existing primary care provider
shortage. 7 2 Investors will invest less in new medical technologies and hospitals
will be forced to reduce new construction and layoff staff. 73
As in other cases, commentators have highlighted the need to link financial
regulation to social issues such as health care:
Infrastructure investments and social spending on nutrition, basic
education and health care are essential.

. .

. A new system of financial

regulation should be built upon two broad principles: the need to
incorporate counter-cyclical mechanisms in order to correct for the
boom-bust nature of financial markets; and effective regulation whereby
the domain of the regulator is the same as the domain of the market to be
regulated, which is global in nature.174
F. Food Security
Global food insecurity results from a variety of factors and threatens one
billion people with malnourishment.'s While the financial crisis was by no
169

170
171
172
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WHO, Fin Crisisand Glob Health at 10 (cited in note 168).
Emily P. Walker, Financial Crisis Will Impact Healthcare Heai, MedPage Today (Oct 10, 2008),
online at http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy/HealthPolicy/11237 (visited Dec
1,2010).
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means the cause of widespread food insecurity, it has exacerbated the crisis."'
Underinvestment in agriculture contributes greatly to food insecurity, and the
financial crisis has worsened that trend.' 7 Increased poverty rates also cause
food insecurity. After the Mexican and Asian financial crises, "poverty rates
increased by up to 24 percentage points,"' and it took five to eight years for
rates to return to prior levels.1' Remittances fall during economic crises.180
Poorer countries, most vulnerable to food insecurity, have been affected by the
most recent crisis to a greater extent than in past crises because the greater level
of global economic integration.'"' At the same time, since the most recent crisis,
unlike past crises, extends beyond particular countries or regions, it has been
more difficult for unaffected countries to step in and relieve suffering.'8 2 As
trade contracts as a result of the financial crisis, it is expected that the global
food crisis will worsen.' It was expected that even following the global food
crisis of 2006-2008, in 2009, for example, the number of people exposed to
food insecurity would increase by 2 percent, even if availability remained
constant.184
The G-20 has already started to address issues of food security by calling
for the creation of the World Bank Food Security Trust Fund following the G8
Summit in L'Aquila, Italy in July, 2008.18' The G8 articulated five principles for a
food security initiative: "1) Stronger coordination among donors[,] 2) Support of
comprehensive strategies[,] 3) Investment through country-owned plans[,] 4)

176
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18, 2008), online at http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2008/1000937/ (visited Dec 1,
2010).
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Leveraging effective multilateral institutions[,] 5) Sustained commitments."
The G-20 committed to these principles in its L'Aquila Summit. 7
G. Other Areas of Concern
Financial crises touch all areas of public concern. Economic crises can
thwart environmental efforts.' Developed countries with depleted resources
back away from commitments to assist developing countries with their climate
change efforts.' Businesses plead for relief from proposed regulations that they
claim would threaten them while they are most vulnerable. 9 0 Education suffers
as depleted treasuries have less to spend on all levels of education. National
security efforts are hampered by reductions in technology investment. A
legitimate system of financial regulation must account for all of these costs and
linkages.
III. LEGITIMACY IN CRISIS
The very real public costs of systemic financial failure"' call into question
the legitimacy of any efforts to regulate, contain, and resolve such failure.
Legitimacy matters because it helps to ensure the success of regulatory efforts.
Ensuring meaningful deliberation by promoting greater participation,
transparency, accountability, and reasoned decision making would arguably
improve the legitimacy of international financial institutions. But these attributes
have costs,19 2 and policy makers should carefully examine these costs at each
regulatory phase of a potential crisis.
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191 Posner and Vermeule, Crisis Governance at 6, 16 (cited in note 43) (noting that "financial regulation
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See, for example, Barr and Miller, 17 Eur J Intl L at 26-27 (cited in note 15) (noting that
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sphere).

Winter 2011

533

ChicagoJournalofInternationalLaw
Policy makers should categorize a civil society institution by the degree of
its expertise and its mission as it relates to the proposed regulatory action. Policy
makers should also place institutions and the decisions they make on a
continuum of norm development from policy setting to detailed rule making.
Generally speaking, civil society groups whose missions closely relate to interests
affected by the institutions' actions should work with institutions at the policysetting end of the continuum while civil society groups with a high degree of
expertise should contribute to institutions when they are performing detailed
rule-making functions. This is a general guide and there are important caveats to
prevent capture and abuse.
A. Legitimacy
Legitimacy matters from a normative and practical perspective. All
institutions that establish norms, whether those norms develop into soft law,
hard law, or no law at all, face legitimacy challenges."' Legitimacy engenders
compliance: it may transform soft law into hard law, spur the internalization of
norms, or simply justify the norm-development process itself.194 The
sociological perception that an institution can and should develop norms aids in
the adoption of those norms.
Global entities face multiple legitimacy challenges.' Global governance
entities are seen as removed from domestic democracy.' They are challenged as
lacking legitimacy or accountability.' Some also claim that global governance
193

See Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, Introduction: Legiimay, justice and PublicInternationalLaw.
Three Perspectives on the Debate, in Legiimay, Justice and PublicInternationalLaw 1-2 (Cambridge 2009)
(L Meyer, ed) (noting that legitimacy matters because it affects power).

194

For a discussion of theoretical basis and practical implications of these phenomena, see generally
Claire R. Kelly, InstitutionalAlliances and Derivative Lgidmag, 29 Mich J Intl L 605, 619 (2008).
Legitimacy can be either a descriptive or sociological matter. First, an institution is descriptively
legitimate if, after one accepts a normative premise of what is right, good, acceptable, desired, or
appropriate, one determines as an objective fact that an institution meets that criteria.
Alternatively one can think of legitimacy as socially constructed; something is legitimate because
people perceive it as legitimate. Either approach requires that we assess the underlying criteria;
either we must agree on what the normative baseline is to argue that something either is or is not
descriptively legitimate, or we must identify criteria that people consider when they develop their
perceptions. Buchanan and Keohane, 20 Ethics & Int'l Affairs at 406-07 (cited in note 148).

195

Kelly, 29 Mich J Int L at 619 (cited in note 194).
See, for example, Barr and Miller, 17 Eur J Intl L at 17 (cited in note 15) (discussing the Basel
Committee as an example of a "transgovernmental regulatory network that exercises vast powers,
seemingly without any form of democratic accountability").

196

197

John Ferejohn, Accountability in a Global Context *21 (Global Admin L Ser Working Paper 2007/5),
(visited
online at htrp://www.iil).org/publications/documents/2007-5.GAL.Ferejohn.web.pdf
Dec 1, 2010).
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entities foster rule by elitist internationalists."' Further, the fragmentation
among regimes calls into question whether any regime properly accounts for all
its linkages and externalities. How one addresses these legitimacy challenges
depends on one's conception of legitimacy.
Assessing legitimacy involves assessing a normative perception.200
Assessing beliefs is impossible, but one can assess the criteria upon which an
institution claims that it is entitled to legitimacy.201 Professor Fritz Scharpf and
later Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have characterized legitimacy criteria as
both input and output criteria.202 Input criteria is "the means by which
constituents participate in IOs, e.g., representation, inclusiveness, or process."20 3
Output criteria 20 4 include "substantive outcomes, for example, trade
liberalization, or fairness, and whether goals set by the international
organizations themselves are reached, that is, [whether] the international
organization [is] effective."2 05
In terms of input legitimacy, international entities can allow for
participation of those affected by their rules,206 and they can attempt to structure
their norms to reflect the will of the entities or people on whose behalf they

199

Compare Paul H. Brietzke, The Poliics OfLegal Reform, 3 Wash. U Global Stud L Rev 1, 49 (2004)
(characterizing some of the byproducts of global legal reforms as "globalization and its elitist
law"). See, for example, Hakan Altinay, Does Fairness Matter In Global Governance? *7 (Brookings
2010), online at
Working Paper 44, Oct
Global Economy & Development
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/10_global-governance altinay/10
global-governance altinay.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010) (noting that international governance
promulgating international environmental and intellectual property rules is "seen as an elitist
framework of international politics and economics"). But see John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos,
GlobalBusiness Regulation 29 (Cambridge 2000).

200

Ian Hurd, AfterAnarchy: Legitimay and Power in the United NationsSecurity Council7 (2008).

201

Id at 7-8.

202

Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? 7-16 (Oxford 1999); Robert 0.
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Between CentraliZationand Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and Problems of DemocraticLegitimay (Kennedy School of Government Working Paper
at
online
2001)
RWP01-004,
Series,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=262175 (visited Dec 125, 2010).
Kelly, 29 Mich J Intl L at 613 (cited in note 194). See also Keohane and Nye, Between CentraliZation
at *12-15 (cited in note 202) (discussing input legitimacy criteria and noting that inputs can be
either electoral or non-electoral).
Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? 2 (Oxford 1999) (discussing input and
output legitimacy); Keohane and Nye, Between CentraliZaionat *3 (cited in note 202) (noting that
both inputs and outputs can affect legitimacy).
Claire Kelly, InstitutionalAlliances & Derivative Legitimay, 29 Mich J Intl L 605, 613 (2008). See
Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the SupranationalScale: GlobalizingAdministrative Law, 115 Yale L J
1490, 1517 (2006) (discussing legitimacy in terms of outcomes).
See Keohane and Nye, Between CentraliZadonat *14 (cited in note 202) (discussing the legitimacy of

203

204

205

206

domestic democracies).
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act.207 International entities can improve their norm generating and law-making
processes through the use of traditional administrative law devices and values,
such as access to information, notice and comment, power sharing, and
review.208
Output legitimacy focuses on the ends--whether the resulting outcome is
a desirable one. Will the outcome be effective, fair, just, well ordered, universally
accepted, or supportive of a particular goal such as human rights or trade
liberalization? 209 Output legitimacy assumes a normative prescription of what is
a good outcome, 210 but this is unavoidable. Even if one believes that a good
outcome is one that will be effective, that is, that it will liberalize trade, constrain
financial markets, or tighten environmental regulation, one still needs to start
with a normative prescription of what it is that one wants to do.
As I have written elsewhere,2 11 I believe that an appropriate measure of
legitimacy must take account of both input and output components to some
extent. Alan Buchanan and Robert Keohane have proposed a normative
standard for institutional legitimacy that captures both output and input criteria,
which I believe is enormously helpful. 2 12 Also, the concept of deliberative
legitimacy is particularly helpful in evaluating international financial
institutions. 2 13 The deliberative democracy framework lends itself to
international financial regulators and norm setters.214 It acknowledges that any
attempt to justify international financial regulation solely on democratic
principles will fail because international norm setters are too far removed from
those affected by their work and ultimately not accountable.2 15 Likewise,
207

208

J at 1504-05 (cited in note 205) (noting that claims to legitimacy are
strongest where there is a sense of community, but that it is increasingly harder for constituents to
identify with policymakers on a global scale).
Id at 1534-37 (discussing how horizontal and vertical power-sharing mechanisms can increase the
legitimacy of international rulemaking); Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, Introducdon: Global
Governance and GlobalAdministraive Law in the InternationalLegal Order, 17 Eur J Intl L 1, 4 (2006)
(noting the tendency of IOs to improve participation and accountability by incorporating various
administrative law mechanisms into their decision-making, including procedures for notice and
comment).
See Esty, 115 Yale L

209
210

Kelly, Legfimay and the UNCITRAL 23-24 (cited in note 9).
Buchanan and Keohane, 20 Ethics & Intl Affairs at 418 (cited in note 148) (discussing the
persistent disagreement over the norms underlying legitimacy).

211

See Kelly,

212

Buchanan and Keohane, 20 Ethics & Intl Affairs at 406 (cited in note 148). They seek to
construct a model that provides for the "ongoing critical revision of [an institution's] goals,
through interaction with agents and organizations outside the institution." Id.

213

Esty, 115 Yale LJ at 1520 (cited in note 205).

214

See Ferejohn, Accountabiliy at 23 (cited in note 197) (arguing that global institutions cannot rely on
traditional democratic principles).
Esty, 115 Yale LJ at 1520 (cited in note 205).

215

giimay and the UNCITRAL

(cited in note 9).
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efficiency justifications for international financial norms fail to account for
participatory values and also for complex linkages and externalities. Deliberative
legitimacy would support an institution's norms where those norms were
formed as a result of deliberation among free and equal participants representing
those affected by the resulting norms.216
In my view it is not essential to settle upon a theory of legitimacy in all
cases, but rather to identify how in particular cases one might improve both
input and output legitimacy criteria whatever one's preferred theory. Here, I
would like to address legitimacy questions by considering whether the
participation of civil society at the various stages of crisis regulation might
improve the legitimacy of those efforts without undermining the efforts
themselves.
B. Can Civil Society Improve Legitimacy in Crisis Regulation?
International financial institutions should carefully calibrate civil society
participation to improve their legitimacy without hampering their efforts. The
value of participation depends on the nature of the civil society group (its
mission and expertise), the level of participation sought and, the function of the
international financial institution. Civil society organizations differ. Some
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) advocate for causes or provide aid.
Other members of civil society provide expertise. Some do both and others
neither.2 17 NGO participation involves a range of activities from mere presence
to voting powers.218 Likewise, international financial institutions perform
different functions ranging from setting policy to coordination to rulemaking.2 19
The benefits of greater participation, which will depend on these factors, include
broader representation of interests, more transparency, greater accountability,
and more reasoned decision-making. 220 These attributes can combine to increase
216 Jon Elster, Introduction, in J. Elster, ed, DeliberativeDemocracy I (Cambridge 1998).
217 We the Peoples: Civil Sodety, the United Nations and Global Governance, Report of the Panel of Eminent
Persons on United Nations-CivilSociety Relations, UN General Assembly, 58th Sess, Agenda Item 59,
http://daccess-ddsat
online
(2004),
A/58/817
Doc
UN
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO4/376/41/PDF/N437641.pdPOpenElement (visited Sept
18, 2010); Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl, Rights and Responsibiliiesin the PoliticalLandscape ofNGO
Accountability: Introduction and Oveniew, in Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tujil, eds, NGO Accountability:
Politics,Prnciples & Innovations 9 (Earthscan 2006).
218 See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries ofPatinpation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 Mich J Ind
L 183, 274-75 (1997) (describing various roles of NGOs).
219 See Mariya Deryugina, Shaping Global Financial Reform: A Symposium for Private and Public Sector
Leaders, 28 Rev Bank & Fin L 683, 692-93 (2009) (noting international financial institutions'
typical functions).
220 These are values that are being discussed in detail by scholars concerned with global governance,
accountability, and legitimacy. See, for example, New York University Institute for International
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an institution's legitimacy in a variety of ways.22' The costs of greater
participation can include delay, manipulation, and failure.222 To determine
whether participation by civil society organizations will be helpful and worth the
cost, each stage of the regulatory and monitoring process needs to be examined
and the respective natures of the civil society organizations and international
financial institutions need to be considered.
1. The scope of participation.
Civil society is a broad term that encompasses NGOs as well as
professional and academic associations. 2 23 The United Nations 2004 Cardoso
Report defines civil society:
Civil society. Refers to the associations of citizens (outside their families,
friends and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests,
ideas and ideologies. The term does not include profit-making activity
(the private sector) or governing (the public sector). Of particular
relevance to the United Nations are mass organizations (such as
organizations of peasants, women or retired people), trade unions,
professional associations, social movements, indigenous people's
organizations, religious and spiritual organizations, academe and public
benefit non-governmental organizations. 224
Thus, civil society may refer to Amnesty International, the American Law
Institute, the International Chamber of Commerce, the Catholic Church, or the
International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy
Professionals. NGOs are a subset of civil society that the Cardoso report
defines as the following:
Non-governmental organiZation (NGO). All organizations of relevance to the

United Nations that are not central Governments and were not created
Law and Justice Global Administrative Law Project, online at http://www.iilj.org/GAL/ (visited
Dec 1, 2010).

223

See, for example, Barr and Miller, 17 Eur J Intl L at 17-18 (cited in note 15) (for example, notice
and comment contributes to greater perceived legitimacy).
See, for example, Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U Pitt L Rev 589, 594 (2002) (noting that notice and comment procedure imposes
costs, delay being among them).
UN GA, CiilSociety Relations at 5 (cited in note 217); Jordan and van Taijl, Rights and Responsibiliies

224

at 9 (cited in note 217).
UN GA, CiilSociety Relations at 13 (cited in note 217).
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by intergovernmental decision, including associations of businesses,
parliamentarians and local authorities. There is considerable confusion
surrounding this term in United Nations circles. Elsewhere, NGO has
become shorthand for public-benefit NGOs-a type of civil society
organization that is formally constituted to provide a benefit to the
general public or the world at large through the provision of advocacy or
services. They include organizations devoted to environment,
development, human rights and peace and their international networks.
They may or may not be membership-based. 225
Here, it is most important to distinguish between the members of civil
society based upon function. Some members of civil society operate as advocacy
or aid organizations in pursuit of a mission ("advocates").226 Thus, Amnesty
International or Greenpeace advocate in pursuit of their missions. The
Episcopalian Church has a mission. Other civil society members have expertise
("experts"). The American Law Institute consists of experts in different legal
fields. Both advocates and experts care about a variety of matters. The National
Association of Pension Funds may be expert in pensions, not insolvency law,
but it may have a very real interest in cross-border insolvency law issues.
Naturally, some expert groups will have a mission and some advocate groups
will have experts. The Institute of International Finance, Inc has both interest
and expertise in what goes on in the Basel Committee. The Association of
Consulting Engineers likely cares deeply how government procurement rules
work and probably knows a significant amount about that subject.
The possibility of granting civil society more access to international
financial regulation is no small task. Civil society already participates in the
formation of international norms. 227 As one author notes, as of the late 1990s,
the expenditures of civil society approached $1.3 trillion, making it the "seventh
largest economy, compared with the economies of states."228 In fact, civil
society, as a nonstate regulator, competes for legitimacy to obtain and retain its
225

Id.

226

For a more detailed description of the various roles that civil society performs including: relief,
political, social and economic development roles among others, see Shamima Ahmed and David
M. Potter, NGOs in InternationalPolics37-58 (Kumarian 2006).
Terry MacDonald, GlobalStakeholder Democray 66 (Oxford 2008).

227
228

Id at 76, citing Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski and Regina List, GlobalCivil Society: An
Overview (Ctr Civ Socy Studies, Inst Poly Studies, John Hopkins 2003). The figure here represents
35 countries surveyed. Others have argued in more specific context that broader civil society
participation can be of significant value in international organizations, including greater access to
more information leading to better decision-making and greater legitimacy. Peter Van den
Bossche, Non-GovernmentalOrganitadonsand the WITO: Limits to Involvement?, in Debra P. Steger, ed,
Redesigning the World Trade Organiationfor the Tweny-first Centuy (Wilfrid Laurier 2009), online at
http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/455-0/ (visited Dec 1, 2010).

Winter 2011

539

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw
relevance.229 Indeed its participation in international institutions aids its
legitimacy efforts.
Existing institutions must decide whether to expand participation from
those directly regulated by their efforts to those potentially affected by their
efforts. More and more, international institutions appreciate the benefits of
greater participation. 23 0 The idea that regulators should hear from those affected
by their actions is a foundational principle of administrative law.231 Some
institutions have even gone beyond permitting the participation of the targets of
their action to allowing for broader participation by all those who might be
affected by regulatory action.232 Thus, even allowing participation by civil society
233
raises the question of how much of civil society can and should participate.
One could limit participation to those entities being regulated (for example,
banks and the NGOs that represent them), to those having expertise that might
aid the regulating institution (for example, the International Association of
Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals), or to any group that
expressed an interest (for example, labor unions).
The degree of optional participation depends on the institution and its
goals. Civil society may be asked to contribute to the pre-norm development
discussion. Some IOs such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO organize
symposia and colloquia to engage civil society. 234 At this level, civil society

229

230

Julia Black, Legitimay and the Competition for Regulatory Share *14 (LSE L, Socy & Econ Working
Paper Ser WPS 14/2009), online at http://www.1se.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS200914_Black.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative
Law, 68 L & Contemp Probs 15, 38 (2005). Indeed in some cases civil society acts as a non-state
regulator. See Julia Black, Construting and Contesting Legitimay and Accountability in Poycentric
Regulatory Regimes *1-2 (LSE L, Socy & Econ Working Papers 2/2008), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1091783 (visited Dec 1, 2010).

231

Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 37 (cited in note 230).

232

See Zaring, 10 Chi J Intl L at 481-84 (cited in note 51) (discussing the comment procedures of
Basel II and IOSCO).
See, for example, IMF, Guidefor Staff Relations with Civil Society OrganiZations (Oct 10, 2003), online
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/cso/eng/2003/101003.htm (visited Dec 1, 2010). As others
have noted, current pluralistic governance regimes rely upon expertise from variety of actors.
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational
New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 Vand J Transnad L 501, 544 (2009)
(discussing bottom up regulation by NGOs).
See,
for
example,
World
Bank,
The
World
Bank
and
Civil
Sodety,

233

234

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,pagePK:220469~theSiteP
K:228717,00.html (visited Dec 1, 2010) (hereinafter World Bank, World Bank and Civil Society);
at
online
OrganiZations,
Sode~y
Civil
and
IMF
IMF,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/civ.htm (visited Dec 1, 2010); Walter Odhiambo,
Paul Kamau and Dorothy McCormick, Kenya's Partirfationin the WTO: Lessons Learnedin Managing
the Challengesof WTO Particztation:45 Case Studies (WTO 2005) (P. Gallagher, P. Low, and A. Stoler,
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exposes norm generators to its views, but it does not necessarily have a direct
impact on how those organizations subsequently develop rules. At the next
level, civil society organizations might participate as observers in norm-setting
processes, either with or without the ability to speak in the proceedings.
UNCITRAL allows experts and other members of civil society to (with
permission) attend and observe, and also contribute to their working groups. 23 5
These experts may contribute information to decision makers and their presence
may improve transparency and accountability. The Basel Committee has
solicited comments on its proposed standards. 23 6 The WTO has permitted
submission of amicus briefs. 237 Finally, civil society could be given a more direct
say in whether a norm or policy is adopted or not. The World Bank consults
with civil society on particular projects.238
Institutions have calibrated the level of civil society participation they
welcome or tolerate depending on the goals of the institution. As indicated
above, although the World Bank's Articles ofAgreement do not provide specifically
for NGO engagement, engagement exists nonetheless. 23 9 The IMF has
developed a policy of engaging with civil society and provides its staff with
guidelines to do so. 240 The OECD has been referred to as a "club" organization
in the past. 24 1 It had incorporated the views of civil society through its Business
and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD (BIAC) and the Trade Union
Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC). In the past decade the OECD has

eds), online
at http://www.wto.org/english/res e/booksp-e/casestudies.e/case20_e.htm
(visited Dec 1, 2010).
235 UNCITRAL, The UNCITRAL Guide 6, UN Sales No E.07.V.12 (2007), online at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/06-50941_Ebook.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
236 Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking On Basek The Future ofInternationalFinancialRegulation 63 n 26 (Peterson
Inst Intl Econ 2008).
237 Additional Procedure for the submission of amicus curiae briefs in WTO, Report of the Appellate
Body, European Communiies - Export Subsidies on Sugar 9 WTO Doc No WT/DS265/AB/R (Apr
28, 2005), online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu.e/265_266_283abre.doc
(visited Dec 1, 2010). See also Atik, 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 458-59 (cited in note 9).
238 Guidance Note on Bank Multi Stakeholder Engagement 3 (June 2009), online at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/07/08/000333037_2
0090708235404/Rendered/PDF/492200BROSecM21010fficial0Use00nlyl.pdf (visited Dec 1
2010).
239 Sergey Ripinsky and Peter Van den Bossche, NGO Involvement in InternationalOrganigations:A Legal
Analysis 152 n 5 (Brit Inst Intl & Comp L 2007); World Bank, World Bank and Civil Society (cited in
note 234).
240 IMF, Guide (cited in note 233).
241 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 144 (Princeton 2004); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National
Regulation of Mulinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comigy, Extraterritoriality, and HarmoniZation, 42
Colum J Transnad L 5, 32 (2003).
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extended its cooperation to other international civil society organizations.242 As
James Salzman recounts, however, the OECD has not adopted a unified
procedure for incorporating administrative law principles generally, and its
inclusion of civil society has varied from project to project. 243 UNCTAD has
made a commitment to integrating civil society and the private sector into its
work.2 " IOSCO submits its work for public comment and posts the comments
it receives.245
Finally, with respect to the scope and degree of participation, even if one
were to opt for broad participation, it is not clear that such participation would
be forthcoming or meaningful. When the Basel Committee sought notice and
comment on its consultative paper, the commentators were primarily the banks
that would be affected by those proposals. As Barr and Miller point out, "[M]ost
participants were large financial institutions. The role of the broader public was
relatively muted, which reflected in part the technical nature of the Basel
Committee's work and the fact that for most public-interested organizations, the
connection between banking standards and broader social concerns was not
pronounced."2 46 Likewise, in 2009, IOSCO invited comments from the public
on its Auditors Communications Consultation Report. It received twenty-two
comments, all from industry representatives.2 47 While those interested in areas of

242

243
244

245
246
247

See

OECD,
Ciil
Sodely,
online
at
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34495 1 1_1_11,00.htmi (visited Dec 1,
2010). For example, as a result of the most recent revisions in OECD's Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, approved on June 27, 2000, the revision process became much more
inclusive than ever before. See Salzman, 68 Law & Contemp Probs at 213 (cited in note 85)
(discussing the OECD's Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises).
Salzman, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 195, 196-217 (cited in note 85).
Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on Its Eleventh Session, UN Conference
on Trade and Development, 11th Sess, UN Doc TD/412 (2004), online at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/td412_en.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
See, for example, note 232 and accompanying text.
Bart and Miller, 17 EurJ Intl L at 26 (cited in note 15).
Tech Comm IOSCO, Auditors Communications Consultation Report. Comment Letters (Feb 2010), online
at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD316.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010). The
commentators were: BDO International Limited, Canadian Public Accountability Board, The
Compagnie Nationale des Comissaires aux Comptes ("CNCC") and the Conseil Superieur de
l'Ordre des Experts-Comptables ("CSOEC"), CPA Australia/Institute of Chartered
Accountants/National Institute of Accountants, Deloitte Touche Tomatsu, Dubai Financial
Services Authority, European Group of International Accounting Networks and Associations,
EUMEDION Corporate Governance Forum, Ernst & Young Global Limited, FAR SRS (The
Institute for the Accountancy Profession in Sweden), Federation of European Accountants,
Grant Thornton International Ltd., Hermes Equity Ownership Services, International Auditing
and Assurance Standards Board, The-Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (Audit and
Assurance Committee), Instituto De Censores Jurados De Cuentas De Espana, Institut der
Wirtschaftsprufer, KPMG International, The Nordic Federation of Public Accountants,
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public concern such as labor or health care may prefer to have their interests
represented in these situations and technically have the option to do so, because
these subjects are technical, arcane and frequently not followed by many in the
public, it is not realistic to expect these interest groups to take advantage of
these participatory invitations in order to sufficiently protect their interests ex
ante.
2. The benefits of participation.
Greater participation improves representation. International institutions
cannot rely upon democratic legitimacy to support their work,2 48 but they can
point to the degree to which they are representative to do so. 249 Representation
of those affected by the entity is important. 25 0 From an input legitimacy
perspective, those affected are likely to be informed of and have a view about
the relevant regulatory alternatives. 251' They can provide important information
about not only what might work but also what externalities might result.252 From
an output legitimacy perspective, rules are perceived as more just when they take
into consideration the views of those affected by them.253 Thus, to the extent
that the inclusion of civil society means greater input in international financial
institutions, that inclusion will improve the legitimacy of those institutions.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, SEC Thailand, Standard Life Investments (with attachment
"Guidelines for Enhanced, Disclosure"). Id.
248

249

250

251

See, for example, Jose E. Alvarez, InternationalOrganizadionsas Law-makers 630-31 (Oxford 2006);
Esty, 115 Yale LJ at 1515 (cited in note 205) (discussing democratic legitimacy).
Esty, 115 Yale L J at 1516 (cited in note 205) (discussing means of obtaining democratic
legitimacy).
Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimaq and Constitutional Perspectives of If/TO Law, 35 J World
Trade, 167, 172-75 (2001).
Carol C. Gould, On The Uneasy Relation Between InternationalLaw And Democrag, 12 ILSA J Intl &
Comp L 559, 562 (2006) (arguing that where decisions of international organizations are removed
from and affect "human rights of people at a distance," the case for "giving these people some
input into" the decision-making process is the strongest).

252

Peter L. Lallas, The Role Of Process And Partization In The Development Of Effective Internaional
EnvironmentalAgreements: A Study Of The Global Treay On Persistent Organic Pollutants (Pops), 19
UCLA J Envir L & Poly 83, 127-28 (2001) (noting that some of the benefits stemming from
NGO representation in the international environmental policy-making process include: "infusion
of alternative perspectives into narrow mission programs; articulation of universal perspectives;
direct participation in enforcement; and direct participation in resources allocation.")

253

Erik B. Bluemel, Substance Without Process:AnayZingTns ParidatoyGuaranteesIn Light Of Protected
Indigenous Rights, 86 J Pat & Trademark Off Socy 671, 712 (2004) (arguing that indigenous peoples,
as stakeholders, ought to participate in decision-making in the TRIPS regime, given their "unique
relationship to the types of resources protected by such regimes," as affecting their "substantive
rights" under the regime).
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The very presence of civil society in the financial regulation process will
improve the prospects for deliberation.254 Deliberative legitimacy requires
deliberation by free, impartial, and equal citizens.2 55 The idea here is where
different persons with different views discuss their perspectives, people might
change their minds. 256 Greater participation and discussion help to legitimize the
end result.257 One could see how members of civil society might have differing
views regarding the appropriate level of risk society should tolerate in light of
perceived gains. 258 Those targeted by the regulation will likely stand to benefit
directly from the risks taken whereas members of civil society might represent
interests that would only be seen as indirectly benefiting from the greater degree
of risk.
The participation of civil society might generate more legitimacy because it
leads to greater transparency and accountability in international financial
institutions. Arguably, civil society participation forces transparency in most
cases. 259 Civil society's participation exposes data, analysis, policy proposals and
all inputs the decision makers use. In fact, it has been noted that international
organizations, because of their nature and structure, "generally meet higher
standard[s] of transparency and justification by reason-giving than most national
systems"2"o To the extent that the participation of a broader public facilitates or
encourages this transparency, participation by civil society also facilitates the
flow of information to national venues that might not otherwise receive it. 261
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Esty, 115 Yale L j at 1520 (cited in note 205). See also Ahmed and Potter, NGOs Intl Pol at 31
(cited in note 226) (discussing Robert Putman, Making Democra Work (Princeton 1993)). Civil
society participation improves government performance and in particular economic performance.
Robert Putnam demonstrated that a well-functioning civil society was indeed indicative of a wellfunctioning government. Robert Putnam, Making Democrag Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy
90-99 (Princeton 1993). While Putnam's work focused on State governments and not
international financial institutions, one would then expect that generally speaking, the
participation of civil society in international financial institutions would generally improve
economic performance.
Elster, Intro at 5 (cited in note 216) (discussing Rawls and Habermas).
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257
258
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J. Leib, Can Direct Democrag Be Made Deliberative, 54 Buff L Rev 903, 910-11 (2006)
(explaining the experiments ofJames Fishkin).
Esty, 115 Yale LJ at 1520-21 (cited in note 205) (discussing deliberative legitimacy).
See Ahmed and Potter, NGOs Intl Pol at 82-83 (cited in note 226) (noting that NGOs raise issues
within international organizations that have not been addressed at the national level). They
provide information, ideas and advice. Id.
Salzman, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 202 (cited in note 85).
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See Robert 0. Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik, Democrag-Enhancing
at
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http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2007-4.GAL.KMM.web.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
See also Barr and Miller, 17 EurJ Intl L at 29 (cited in note 15).
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Civil society participation may also improve accountability. In order to
discuss accountability, one first needs to ask to whom these institutions are
accountable in the first place and then assess whether the participation of civil
society aids accountability.2 62 On the issue of to whom an institution is
accountable, one can have different views.263 For example, one can identify
IOSCO as accountable to securities regulators narrowly, to people who buy
securities, or to the public at large. The WTO is accountable to the states that
are represented there, but also arguably to the public that finds its government
constrained by trade rules (or not constrained enough) during a crisis.
Institutions often have multiple communities to which they are accountable and
often even have conflicting demands among them.26 One could argue that
legitimate institutions should continually evaluate their obligations to all of these
communities.265
When considering whether to take a broad or narrow view of
accountability, it is worthwhile to note that global institutions are removed from
political accountability.2 66 As such, they have little reason to be responsive to
public sentiment. 267 This insulation weighs in favor of a broad view. Moreover,
as discussed above, the implications of these institutions' decisions reach
beyond those directly regulated by them and thus also weigh in favor of the
broad view of accountability.
In national regulatory systems, judicial review aids accountability.26 8
International regulators are not subject to judicial review. However, civil society
participation can enhance public pressure. Transparency "promote[s]
accountability directly by exposing administrative decisions and relevant
documents to public and peer scrutiny." 2 69
262

Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model For Global Administrative Law?, 68 L &
Contemp Probs 63, 68-69 (2005).

263

Id.

264

Black, Constructingat 5-10 (cited in note 230).

265

See Buchanan and Keohane, 20 Ethics & Intl Affairs at 406 (cited in note 148) (noting that
legitimate global governance requires revision of goals "through interaction with agents and
organizations outside the institution[]")

266

John Ferejohn suggests that as a result they should be encouraged to rely upon deliberation and
critique within global civil society, to assure that policies are responsive to all legitimate interests.
Ferejohn,Accountabilty at 23 (cited in note 197).

267

Id.

268

Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 69 (cited in note 262).
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Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 38 (cited in note 230). . In financial
regulation, it has been suggested that transparency by central banks leads to less inflationary bias
and greater flexibility. See Petra M. Geraats, Why Adopt Transpareng?The Publicationof CentralBank
Forecasts (EU Cent Bank Working Paper Ser Working Paper No 41 Jan 2001), online at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp04l.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
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Lastly, civil society participation can improve reasoned decision-making.
Most domestic administrative systems require reasoned decision-making.2 70
"Global-scale policymaking" needs reasoned decisions because national systems
sometimes transplant globally developed norms without serious debate.27 '
Daniel Esty explains that in the global context,
All global-scale policymaking should include written decisions that (1)
clearly delineate the legal basis for the policymaking activity and the scope
of authority delegated to the decision making body; (2) provide a
statement of the public interest that highlights the designated policy ends
and presents any critical normative assumptions; (3) outline the rationale
for the outcome settled upon, providing a basis for judging whether the
choices made were arbitrary or capricious; (4) build on an established
administrative record or docket (which also facilitates review); (5) respond
to criticisms advanced through the notice-and-comment process; and (6)
address relevant policy alternatives. 272
The notion is that the decision should respond to major arguments in a
reasoned way. 273 Reasoned decision making leads to better decisions and thus
improves output legitimacy criteria. It also demonstrates deliberative legitimacy.
3. The costs of participation.
Greater participation can slow and even derail regulatory efforts.274
Offering the opportunity to civil society to participate takes time as does the
need to respond to participants' concerns.27 s Participants, and particularly those
that might be targeted by any regulatory action, might work to shift the forum

272

Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 39 (cited in note 230). Others would
posit that nonprofits are accountable to their mission, rather than a particular constituency. Dana
Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civl Society: The Sodal Cost of Internally Undemocratc Nonpfits, 82 Or
L Rev 829, 837 (2003).
Barr and Miller, 17 Eur J Intl L at 20-21 (cited in note 15) (discussing Basel and noting that
national enactment can be a mere formality). Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp
Probs at 31-34 (cited in note 230) (discussing the domestic system as a check on the international
system).
Esty, 115 Yale LJ at 1529-30 (cited in note 205).
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Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 39 (cited in note 230).
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The delay and possible derailment may result from greater participation where special interest
groups may seek to distort outcomes. See Esty, 115 Yale L J at 1531-32 (cited in note 205)
(discussing the potential for interest groups to take over the debate).
Barr and Miller, 17 EurJ Intl L at 26 (cited in note 15).
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of the negotiations to another more favorable forum.27 6 Participation may even
thwart negotiations altogether.277
Greater participation might allow special interests to have undue influence
over outcomes.2 78 Capture is likely where the benefits and costs are distributed
so that majority interests are diffuse while the special interests are
concentrated.7 One can imagine how the dangers of capture are magnified at
the international level.280 This may be a particular problem in complex and
technical fields, which require participants to be fluent in the field of regulatory
action. The same groups that want access to these norm setters exist in the
domestic sphere where administrative law constrains the norm setters and
access to them. 28 1 These actors include interest groups, business interests, and
civil society.2 82 Among these groups in the international setting are those who
have convinced their national governments to adopt their positions, those who
failed to convince their national governments to adopt their positions, and the
officials of the national governments who may have been intimately involved in
formulating the national position.283 From the first group's perspective, less
access at the international level might be better to safeguard its government's
adoption of its view. The second group would almost certainly like a second bite
at the apple.
The dangers of capture also remind us that civil society may already have a
route to regulators that can be managed more effectively: working through

276

277

278

279
280

281

See, for example, Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shyfing: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Propery Lawmaking, 29 Yale J Intl L 1, 20-23 (2004) (discussing regime
shifting and intellectual property).
See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Law in GlobalAdministrative Law, 20 Eur J Intl L 23, 35
(2009); Esty, 115 Yale L J at 1520 (cited in note 205) (noting that participation can bog down the
process).
Esty, 115 Yale L J at 1524-26 & 1531-32 (cited in note 205). See also, Abbott and Snidal, 42
Vand J Transnatl L at 553-55 (cited in note 233) (noting the possibility of capture but also noting
the chance of capture is reduced in some instances).
Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A CriticalIntroduction 24 (Chicago
1991).
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, TransnadonalRegulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 Yale J Intl L 113, 170
(2009) (noting that the more domestic autonomy regulators have, the "more likely they are to
enhance international enforcement and harmonization of standards - but also to act in ways that
reflect the self-interest of regulators rather than aggregate welfare."). As Jeffrey Atik notes,
capture is a particular danger in foreign relations and "[t]his is especially true with respect to
international trade policy." Atik, 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 455 (cited in note 9).
Eyal Benvenisti, The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the Evolution of Administrative Law in
InternationalInstitutions,68 L & Contemp Probs 319, 320 (2005).

282

Id at 325.

283

Id.

Winter 2011

547

Chicagojournalof InternationalLaw
national authorities in national administrative law systems.2 8 On the other hand,
some national systems fail to provide meaningful access to a range of
constituents, making global administrative law the only alternative. 285
Transparency has its problems as well. Transparency can inhibit successful
international negotiations, which require confidentiality and diplomatic
discretion. 286 Although it is one thing to invite civil society to participate in
international fora and to give it access to the data that the decision makers will
have, civil society might still be excluded from important parts of the process. 287
In international talks, much work happens during consultative breaks and
lunches. 8 Differences are ironed out outside of the negotiating forum where
transparency is nonexistent. Pushing transparency may actually push talks to less
transparent venues.
Finally, the desirability of civil society participation depends in part on
whether particular civil society organizations are duly accredited to speak on
behalf of those whom they claim as constituents. Some international NGOs, for
example, have committed to an accountability charter that sets forth certain
minimal requirements of transparency, accountability and participation within
NGOs.2 89 Some international institutions have established accreditation systems
for NGOs. 29 0

284
285
286
287
288

289

290

See Barr and Miller, 17 Eur J Intl L at 34 (cited in note 15) (discussing the role of national
congressional oversight in the Basel process).
Id at 43 (citing global administrative law as a "counterweight" to "weak domestic administrative
law protections").
Stewart, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 68 (cited in note 262) (discussing "norms of confidentiality in
negotiation").
See Barr and Miller, 17 EurJ Intl L at 23 (cited in note 15).
See, for example, Ann Marie Clark, et al, The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Sodety, in T. Sinclair, ed,
Global Governance: CriticalConcepts in Poltcal Science 287, 316 n 43 (Routledge 2004) (noting the
frequently informal context for meeting and gatherings); Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, Beyond Lisbon: A
European Strategy for Globalization 154 (Peter Lang 2008) (suggesting informal meetings for
international financial regulators).
Press Release, NGOs lead by example: World's internationalNGOs endorse accountability charter (Oxfam
at
online
2006),
7,
Jun
Intl
http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060606ngo-charter
(visited Dec 1,
2010); INGO Accountability Charter, online at http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/readthe-charter/ (visited Dec 1, 2010).
Peter van den Bossche, Regulatog Legiinag of the Role of NGOs in Global Governance: Legal Status and
Accreditaion, in A. Vedder, ed, NGO Involvement in International Governance and PoAg: Sources of
Lgiimag, 138-52 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007).
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4. Calibrating participation during regulation and rescue.
Entities should tailor civil society participation to allow greater access by
advocates at the policy-making level and to experts at the rule-making level
during both crisis prevention and resolution. The value of the additional input
given by civil society-in terms of participation, transparency, accountability,
and deliberation-is a contextual matter. We may not care to have Amnesty
International advising the Basel Committee on banking rules, but we also do not
want the G-20 to only hear from bankers. Further, we should be mindful that
decisions made at the policy level determine who is an expert at the rule-making
level. At the rule-making level, the participation of experts poses a special
danger of capture. It seems unlikely that greater participation of either advocates
or experts would be worth the cost or even possible at the containment stage.
If we consider civil society participation as something we wish to
encourage, we need to identify when and how it will be most useful. As Daniel
Esty has already argued, "deliberation must be structured carefully so that the
gains from the participation in policymaking of business entities, NGOs, and
individuals are optimized without losing the capacity to make decisions in a
representative and efficient fashion." 291' Given the variables regarding the scope
of possible participation, its costs and benefits, plus the various institutions
where it might take place, it would be impossible to map exactly where and how
greater participation would be worth the costs. But we can at least identify some
factors to consider.
At the regulatory phases, crisis prevention and resolution, civil society
participation can give regulators more input regarding costs. Civil society
participants may identify costs that had not been considered or shed light on
how the hardship that might flow from regulatory failure might be valued.
Admittedly, this participation will lead to delays. The Basel Committee
experimented with this type of broader participation in 2005 by using a notice
and comment procedure.292 Its work slowed tremendously as a result. 293
The timing and the nature of the consultation matter, both in terms of the
value of the participation and whether that participation hampers action. The
IMF has established a Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society Organi.Zations in
which it envisions that the participation of civil society will take the form of
meetings. Staff are instructed to: give "opportunity for questions and comments;
debate options; be sensitive to cultural differences; use plain language; if
possible use the first language of the majority of participants; avoid impressions
291
292
293

Esty, 115 Yale LJ at 1521 (cited in note 205).
Barr and Miller, 17 Eur J Intl L at 26 (cited in note 15).
Verdier, 34 Yale J Intl L at 141 (cited in note 280) (discussing the comment procedure for Basel
II).
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of arrogance. Listening is crucial in a good working relationship."294 The IMF
also cautions staff meeting with civil society to "meet ... early enough in policy
processes that the consultation is meaningful; meet ahead of and between as
well as during missions." 2 9 Arguably, consultations at the policy-planning stage
would be helpful for gaining information from civil society and would be less
likely to delay decisions in the same way that a notice and comment procedure
might. It seems particularly important to hear from advocacy groups at this
agenda-setting stage before detailed plans of action are formed. 296 NGOs have a
successful history of agenda setting, convincing "publics and governments that a
new way of viewing problems opens up opportunities for resolution of those
problems."297
The IMF's guidelines regarding "reaching out" to civil society could be
pushed a step further to envision a system where agenda setting must include a
broader view of policy implications and a broader range of interests. Indeed, the
coordinating activities of the G-20 suggest that it might be time to envision
financial regulation as integrated with and integral to every part of society.298 It is
easy enough to dispute the linkage between systemic financial and public law
concerns, such as health care or the environment, as insufficient for supporting
the need for greater civil society participation. After all it proves too much. The
linkages merely show that when times are hard, everyone suffers. But
participation is not an on/off switch; it can and should be calibrated to the
function performed by the institution. The G-20, for example, sets the agenda.
It coordinates the activities of other entities such as the Basel Committee, the
IMF, World Bank, and FSB. In fact, it directs those organizations to accomplish
tasks pursuant to certain timelines. The coordinating activities of the G-20
suggest that as an agenda-setting entity, it really must respond or be open to civil
society input, especially input from advocates wishing to have their concerns
placed on the agenda.
For example, one of the G-20's projects involves the Pittsburgh
Commitment to phase out fossil fuel energy subsidies in partnership with the
OECD, the International Energy Agency, OPEC, and the World Bank.299 It
294

IMF, Guide (cited in note 233).

295

Id.

296

See, for example, Ahmed and Potter, NGOs Intl Pol at 48 (cited in note 226) (discussing the
agenda setting roles of NGOs).
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This shift might be appropriate because as others have noted, we are moving to a new era of
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state. See Howse, 121 Harv L Rev at 1533 (cited in note 150).
G20, Pittsburgh Leaders' Statement, Preamble % 28-30 (Sept 24-25, 2009), online at
http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm (visited Dec 1, 2010)
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would seem particularly helpful to have civil society advocates' input at this
priority setting stage in order to identify important linkages that need to get onto
the agenda. At the same time, one could also envision a more active role for
certain groups within civil society when the details of programs are being
discussed by, for example, the World Bank or the OECD; but in these
situations, it would be more useful to hear from experts."oo
In the detailed rule-making setting, experts have something to add. As
discussed above, both the Basel Committee and IOSCO have invited public
comment with the result of only hearing from basically the same voices. They
deal in technical fields where it takes some level of technical expertise to be
helpful. In fact, to tout the public comment procedure in these entities is a bit
misleading, as the public at large has virtually no say in the process. These notice
and comment proceedings are forums for experts and to some extent forums
for capture.
Another forum where it proves difficult for non-expert (advocate)
members of civil society is the WTO. The WTO's trade rules constrain (to some
extent) 301 the power that national authorities had to respond to the crisis. The
explication of these rules occurs in the dispute-settlement process rather in a
legislative setting.302 While the WTO has allowed some public participation in its
dispute-settlement process, it has been very limited by the WTO. Moreover, it is
limited by the fact that the rules in place are very constraining and leave little
room for interests other than trade interests. Advocates would be better served
if they could influence policy matters at the WTO. Unfortunately, policy makers
at the WTO are stalled and only the dispute settlement mechanism continues to

roll along.3 0 3
The OECD has engaged both advocate and expert members of civil
society in different projects. As an information-generating institution, it has
taken advantage of civil society participation in a number of its projects
including OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, food and agricultural
policy, and Green Growth work.3 04 It has also reached out to experts for its rule300

As discussed above, for example, the OECD has become more open to civil society participation
(on a case-by-case basis) including on issues pertaining to sustainable development. OECD,
OECD Urban Roundtable for Mayors and Ministers: Cities and Green Growth, online at
http://www.oecd.org/site/0,3407,en_21571361_45068056_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (visited Dec 1,
2010). See also OECD, Civil Sodety and the OECD (OECD Observer Policy Brief Nov 2005),
online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/3/35744346.pdf (visited Dec 1, 2010).
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Atik, 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 467 (cited in note 9).
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making activities. Recently, it sought public comments on its draft of Value
Added Tax/Good and Services Tax (VAT/GST) Guidelines dealing with
customer location for identifying the jurisdiction of taxation. 305
In terms of monitoring components of pre-crisis regulation, civil society
likely could contribute by monitoring the monitors. Perhaps it could enhance
transparency by doing so. Other than serving as a check on monitors, it is not
clear what else civil society could add. Monitoring requires both information and
expertise. Monitors need to understand the data and all its implications.
At the resolution stage, regulators wind up the prior crisis and turn their
attention toward the future to reassess priority setting. This involves resolving
the past crisis by dividing up the losses and establishing frameworks to monitor
and avoid future crises. Thus, for example, the IMF has engaged in work with
the G-20 to resolve the 2008 crisis. 30' Among the work planned is an assessment
of whether "policies are collectively consistent with sustainable and balanced
global growth. . . . [including] . . . rules pertaining to capital and liquidity, a

minimum toolkit for addressing systemic risk, and a framework for working out
cross-border resolution issues."307 These are the types of issues where broader
participation may enhance legitimacy. Again, this can be characterized as policysetting at the macro level that will be imposed upon society at large.
Resolution also requires exit from the measures taken during the period of
containment.30s In order to plan and implement a market-based exit that will
preserve financial stability, regulators need to avoid surprises, have access to
necessary information, and act in coordination.30 But regulators must also
consider the impact of withdrawal of containment measures on the real
economy. First, regulators need to identify the linkages to be considered. This is
a broad policy setting exercise where advocates might be helpful. Then
regulators must implement the plan. This is a narrow task, calling for expertise.
At the rescue stage, civil society participation should likely be limited. First,
national authorities typically implement containment measures, so it is difficult
to speculate on the effect of civil society participation at the international level.
In the US, for example, the Treasury guaranteed payments to auto-parts
305

306

See OECD Center for Tax Policy and Administration, OECD releases draft Guidelines on the
application of VAT/GST to the internationaltrade in serices and intangiblesfor pubc consultation, online at
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(visited Dec 1, 2010).
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suppliers1 o and the Federal Reserve provided funding to ease the purchase of
Bear Stearns by JP Morgan.31' Participation on the national front may be
warranted, but at least in the US, agencies are sometimes expected to act in
emergencies when there may be little time for participation. 312 Courts and the
polling booths provide accountability in these situations. 313
Moreover, during a crisis, markets need swift action. Within a little over a
year, the World Bank supplied over $89 billion to developing and middleincome countries.3 14 Although the G-20 does not set standards, its actions
during crisis serve to instill confidence and stabilize the markets. The G-20 acted
quickly to provide greater oversight of the financial markets." It called upon
the FSB to respond as soon as possible. At the London Summit in September
2009 it called for:
Tackling non-cooperative jurisdictions (NCJs): delivering an effective
programme of peer review, capacity building and countermeasures to
tackle NCJs that fail to meet regulatory standards, AML/CFT and tax
information exchange standards; standing ready to use countermeasures
against tax havens from March 2010; ensuring developing countries
benefit from the new tax transparency, possibly including through a
multilateral instrument; and calling on the FSB to report on criteria and
compliance against regulatory standards by November 2009.316
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judicial review in the US).
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While it is not clear what civil society could add here, there may be some
instances where broader participation would be possible. For example,
regulators should plan for crisis containment; when they do, they could try to
include civil society in developing their frameworks. In other words, to the
extent that policy makers can plan for crises, civil society could participate in the
planning. The FSB, for example, monitors a host of regulatory efforts that are in
part to provide for a sound financial system,31 but it also prepares procedures
for crisis resolution.1 International rules may contain crises by preventing
protectionist practices. Thus, the WTO's trading rules established prior to the
crisis worked to monitor and constrain protectionist trade policies. 3 1 To the
extent that the trading rules are established ex ante, it would seem appropriate to
allow greater participation in their development,32 especially during a time of
crisis when they will need greater legitimacy in order to be politically
acceptable.321
Likewise, international insolvency regimes will play a part in containment.
Cross-border insolvency rules are developed pre-crisis and should include civil
society participation. Several groups have grappled with the construction of
cross-border insolvency rules.32 2 The G-7, G-22, the OECD, and UNCITRAL
along with the development banks, have all tried to address cross border
insolvency.32 3 Notably UNCITRAL has made great strides in creating its
Legislative Guide on Insolveny Law. 324 In doing so, it has opened its proceedings to
an array of experts and interested entities included within civil society. While
these expert entities have the opportunity to contribute to developing the
317 FSB, Publications(cited in note 1).
318 FSB, FSF Prinales(cited in note 62).
319

320
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detailed rules, 3 2s there has been little input on the policy setting level from
advocacy groups in this area.
V. CONCLUSION
Calls abound for greater participation of civil society in international
governance. The 2008 financial crisis brought into focus the linkages between
financial regulation and other areas of public concern, supporting the argument
that greater attention should be paid to increasing civil society participation in
international financial institutions. But more is not always better, and
participation can and should be calibrated. Consideration of various civil society
organizations, what benefits and costs they bring and when, suggests that a
nuanced approach to their participation would work best. The approach
outlined in this article is just that--an approach, a general guide. Generally
speaking, advocate organizations should play more of a role in the policy-setting
stage of crisis regulation while experts can play more of a role in the actual
standard-setting. Neither group will have much role to play in the rescue
operations as these functions are largely performed on a national level and in
any event need to be done quickly. Greater participation in the regulatory
function will likely improve the legitimacy of these institutions, which will be
beneficial at all stages to those affected by those institutions.
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UNCITRAL's Working Methods provide for the participation of civil society but more
specifically have limited that participation to groups that have a particular interest and expertise in
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